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THE SCOPE OF U.S. SENATE CONTROL OVER THE
CONCLUSION AND OPERATION OF TREATIES
STEFAN A. RIESENFELD*
FREDERICK M. ABBOT**
I. INTRODUCTION
This article will briefly describe the basic allocation of the treaty
power in the United States and the status of treaty law in the municipal
legal system. These matters are the subject of a number of excellent stud-
ies by American' and foreign scholars. 2 Our main concern, however, is
with a particular feature of the constitutional landscape-the role which
the Senate plays in the treaty-making process through the attachment of
qualifications to resolutions of ratification; namely amendments, reserva-
tions, understandings, declarations, and provisos. 3 We are concerned
* Emanuel S. Heller Professor of Law Emeritus, University of California, Berkeley; Professor
of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the Law.
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I. See, e.g., Myres S. McDougal & Asher Lans, Treaties and Congressional-Executive Agree-
ments: Interchangeable Instruments of International Diplomacy, 54 YALE L.J. 181-351, 534-615
(1945), imprinted in MYRES S. McDOUGAL ET AL., STUDIES IN WORLD PUBLIC ORDER (1st ed.
1960, reprinted 1987); Stefan A. Riesenfeld, The Power of Congress and the President in International
Relations" Three Recent Supreme Court Decisions, 25 CAL. L. REV. 643 (1937); C. H. McLaughlin,
The Scope of the Treaty Power in the United States (pts. 1 & 2), 42 MINN. L. REV. 709 (1958), 43
MINN. L. REV. 651 (1959); Louis HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION (1972);
MICHAEL J. GLENNON, CONSTITUTIONAL DIPLOMACY (1990). For historical perspective, see SA-
MUEL B. CRANDALL, TREATIES, THEIR MAKING AND ENFORCEMENT (2d ed. 1916). An excellent
overview of the U.S. treaty process is in CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, TREATIES AND
OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS: THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE, A STUDY
PREPARED FOR THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS BY THE CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH
SERVICE, S. Rirr. No. 98-205, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984) [hereinafter Cong. Res. Study].
2. See, e.g., LuzIus WILDHABER, TREATY-MAKING POWER AND CONSTITUTION (1971).
3. This area has received far less scholarly attention than the treaty power in general, Profes-
sors Henkin, Glennon and one of the co-authors being the notable exceptions. With respect to Louis
Henkin, see, e.g., The Treaty Makers and the Law Maker" The Niagara Power Reservation, 56
COLUM. L. REV. 1151 (1956); FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 1, at 133-36,
160-61; Treaties in a Constitutional Democracy, 10 MICH. J. INT'L L. 406 (1989); The ABM Treaty
and the Constitution: Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 81-105 (1987) (testimony of Henkin and others).
With respect to Michael J. Glennon, see, e.g., CONSTITUTIONAL DIPLOMACY (1990), supra note 1,
which incorporates a number of prior works concerning the foreign affairs and treaty powers. With
respect to Stefan A. Riesenfeld, see, e.g., The Power of Congress and the President in International
Relations, supra note 1, and International Agreements, in Reviews of the Restatement (Third) of the
Foreign Relations Law of the United States, 14 YALE J. INT'L L. 455. See also Note, The Reservation
Power and the Connally Amendment, 11 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 323 (1978). Human rights schol-
ars have focused on some of the issues we will discuss. See, e.g., David Weissbrodt, United States
Ratification of the Human Rights Covenants, 63 MINN. L. REV. 35, 70 (1978).
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with the effect these conditions are accorded by the President, United
States courts, and the international community. We are concerned with
whether a minority of the Senate will be enabled to effect an influence on
the international and domestic legal process greatly in excess of the con-
stituency it represents. We believe that the phenomenon of Senate condi-
tions must be carefully examined in the light of developments in the
international legal system, and particularly the growing acceptance of
individuals and individual rights as proper subjects of international law.
The Constitution of the United States speaks very briefly to the
treaty-making power.4 This is not remarkable as the Constitution is on
the whole a terse instrument. The U.S. Supreme Court has spoken infre-
quently on the respective roles of the Executive and Legislative branches
in the treaty-making process. The development of the separation of pow-
ers with respect to the respective roles of the Legislative and Executive
branches in the United States treaty-making process has therefore come
primarily from the organic and continuous process of interaction be-
tween these political branches. This process of evolution has proceeded
from President Washington's often quoted declaration that having once
gone directly to the Senate to discuss a prospective treaty, he would be
damned if he would ever do so again;5 to the endorsement by Congress
of, and acquiescence by the Supreme Court to, the last-in-time doctrine
and its implicit adoption of a partially dualist constitutional system; to
the growing role of Senate reservations, understandings, declarations and
provisos in the treaty-making process; and most recently to the promi-
nence of the Congressional-Executive agreement and the "fast track"
procedure.
Certain fundamental issues concerning the allocation of power be-
4. The U.S. Constitution refers to treaty-making in the context of the process by which the
President acts with the advice and consent of the Senate, although this is only one of a number of
treaty-making procedures. As a result, U.S. practice often distinguishes between treaties and other
international agreements even though the distinction is not meaningful from an international law
perspective. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, § 303, cmt. a
[hereinafter RESTATEMENT] and Cong. Res. Study, supra note 1, at 60. We use the word "treaty"
throughout this article in its international sense, i.e., without reference to the customary distinction
in United States practice between treaties and other forms of international agreement, except where
the context specifically indicates otherwise.
The RESTATEMENT is one of a series of treatises prepared under the auspices of the American
Law Institute, a private organization whose members are elected on the basis of their standing in the
legal profession. The treatises are primarily intended to formulate and clarify the law as it is applied
in United States courts. As will be apparent, we are in disagreement with the Restatement on certain
issues relating to the municipal legal effect of reservations and understandings to treaties. See also
Stefan A. Riesenfeld, International Agreements, supra note 3, at 458.
5. See Cong. Res. Study, supra note 1, at 30-33, recounting first and last visit of President
Washington to Senate to discuss prospective treaty with Creek Indians and his statement of dissatis-
faction as recorded in the memoirs of John Quincy Adams.
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tween the Executive, Legislative and Judicial branches of government in
the United States deserve particular attention in light of the rules of in-
ternational law which impact on the American constitutional process. A
most serious constitutional issue is whether the Senate (or the Congress)
has the power to attach reservations or understandings to treaties which
are not valid and effective under international law, and yet cause them to
have binding effect in United States courts. Of particular concern are
recent attempts by the Senate to expressly reserve the supremacy of the
internal law of the United States with respect to important international
legal instruments and to determine by declaration the non-self-executing
character of various treaties. 6 Of perhaps equal concern is whether the
Senate (or the Congress) has the power to control the interpretation of
treaties in a manner inconsistent with their international interpretation,
yet with binding domestic effect. Our concerns are by no means limited
to the field of human rights, although it is in this area that the most
troubling manifestations of misguided Senate effort have emerged. As the
international legal system continues the trend toward developing and
protecting the rights and interests of individuals-in the fields of the en-
vironment, trade, communications and so forth--questions relating to
the conditions under which such rights may be invoked in national
courts will become of increasing importance. It is therefore of the utmost
urgency to consider who will determine the scope of these rights and
under what rules.
II. TREATY LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
The municipal law of the United States with respect to treaties (like
the law of other nations) must concern itself with the status of treaty law
in the municipal legal framework, the internal allocation of the treaty-
making power, the power to execute and interpret treaties and the power
to terminate treaties. The U.S. Constitution expressly addresses the sta-
tus of treaty law in the municipal system and the treaty-making proce-
dure, but in each case in a manner that leaves considerable room for
interpretation. The powers to execute and interpret treaties are implicitly
allocated by various provisions of the Constitution, while the power to
terminate is the least well addressed.
6. Congress as a whole has also specified the non-self-executing nature of trade agreements in
implementing legislation, but this is distinguishable on constitutional grounds from the actions of the
Senate. See discussion infra text accompanying notes 269-75.
19911
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
A. Treaties in International Law
1. Treaty Defined
The international law of treaties is codified in the Vienna Conven-
tion on the Law of Treaties of 1969.7 The United States signed but has
not yet ratified the Convention. Although the United States is not a party
to the Convention, the U.S. Department of State as well as the courts
have indicated that they consider the Convention for the most part to
restate the customary international law of treaties.8 According to that
Convention, a treaty is an international agreement between states in writ-
ten form and governed by international law.9 The validity of a treaty is
not dependant on its form or its label,' 0 and the consent of the parties to
its making may be expressed by a variety of means."
In addition to the Vienna Convention rules, the law of treaties is
supplemented by customary international law, general principles of law
recognized by municipal legal systems and, as subsidiary sources, judicial
decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified scholars.' 2
2. Self-executing or Executory Character
Treaties may not require municipal implementing legislation and
may create rights in favor of individuals which are directly cognizable by
municipal courts. Such treaties are generally referred to as "self-execut-
ing." ' 3 Treaties may expressly provide for a self-executing character or
7. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 UNTS 331 (entered into
force Jan. 27, 1980; not in force for the United States), U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 39 (1969), reprinted in 63
AM. J. INT'L L. 875 (1969) [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
8. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 4, at Part 11, Introductory Note, for reference to State
Department statement that Vienna Convention is recognized as authoritative guide to current law
and practice (prior to its entry into force), for references to Department statements that particular
provisions codify existing international law, and for authorities demonstrating that U.S. courts have
treated particular provisions as authoritative.
9. Vienna Convention, supra note 7, at art. 2 (lXa).
10. Id
11. The Vienna Convention specifies "signature, exchange of instruments constituting a treaty,
ratification, acceptance, approval or accession" as well as "any other means if so agreed." Vienna
Convention, supra note 7, at art. 11. An interesting form of international agreement is reflected in
the mutual adherences of Iran and the United States to the Declarations by the Government of the
Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria employed in resolving the hostage dispute and claims.
See Riesenfeld, International Agreements, supra note 3, at n.12.
12. These are, of course, the sources of law prescribed for the International Court of Justice by
Article 38 of the Statute of the Court. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 4, §§ 102-03, 112.
13. See generally Stefan A. Riesenfeld, Jurisdiction over Foreign Flag Vessels and the U.S.
Courti" Adrift without a Compass?, 10 MICH. J. INT'L L. 241 (1989); Stefan A. Riesenfeld, The
Doctrine of Self-Executing Treaties and US. .Postal: Win at Any Price?, 74 AM. J. INT'L L. 892
(1980) (citations therein at notes 16 and 17) [hereinafter Win at Any Price?]; Stefan A. Riesenfeld,
Note on the Doctrine of Self-Executing Treaties and GA 7T." A Notable German Judgment, 65 AM. J.
INT'L L. 548 (1971). The idea of the self-executing treaty may be traced back at least as early as the
574 [Vol. 67:571
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such character may be implied from the terms and context. Treaties may
be self-executing in some parts and not in others. In contrast, other trea-
ties require municipal legislative action before private rights may be en-
forced, if the enforceability of such rights is contemplated at all. These
are generally referred to as "executory" or "non-self-executing" treaties.
Treaties which require the substantial expenditure of public funds are
generally of an executory character since they typically require the pas-
sage of budgetary legislation in order to take effect.14
The question whether a treaty is self-executing or executory has
both an international law and a municipal constitutional law component.
The constitutions of some countries, such as the United States, directly
incorporate treaty law into the municipal order without separate action
by the legislature. In these countries, the right of individuals to invoke
self-executing treaty law in the courts is immediately effective without
additional action by the legislature. In other countries, such as the
United Kingdom, treaties deemed to be self-executing by other countries
require parliamentary action before the courts will recognize individual
rights. The nature of the municipal constitutional order does not affect
the ultimate cognizability in domestic courts of the treaty under interna-
tional law. A state which fails to promptly take the steps necessary to
implement a self-executing treaty places itself in default of its interna-
tional obligations. 5
3. Relationship to Municipal Law
The Vienna Convention provides that a state may not interpose its
internal law as a defense to the failure to perform its obligations under a
treaty. 16 The Convention also provides that a party may not use its own
failure to comply with internal legal requirements to invalidate its con-
sent to a treaty unless the violation was manifest and concerned an inter-
nal rule of fundamental importance. 17 The rule that a state may not
Treaty of Peace between Spain and the Netherlands of January 30, 1648 which includes numerous
self-executing provisions. See Riesenfeld, International Agreements, supra note 3, at 464. It should
be noted that the doctrine of self-executing treaties is accepted also by the European Community and
many nations, although its practical importance is diminished in nations which require bicameral
assent to ratification. Of recent articles, see also Yuji Iwasawa, The Doctrine of Self-Executing Trea-
ties in the United States, 26 VA. J. INT'L L. 627 (1986); John Jackson, Status of Treaties in Domestic
Legal Systems: A Policy Analysis, 86 AM.J. INT'L L. 310 (1992); Jordan Paust, Self-Executing Trea-
ties, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 760 (1988). See also the comparative study, THE EFFECT OF TREATIES IN
DoMEsTIC LAW (Francis Jacobs & Shelley Roberts eds., 1987).
14. See Riesenfeld, Win at Any Price?, supra note 13, n.30 and authorities cited therein.
15. See id at 898-900.
16. Vienna Convention, supra note 7, at art. 27.
17. Id at art. 46.
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interpose its internal law to defeat its obligations under a treaty raises the
issue whether a state may nevertheless interpose its internal rules for mu-
nicipal but not international legal purposes. The view that treaties take
precedence over municipal law is reflected in the French Constitution.' 8
Under the French Constitution, the municipal and international legal ef-
fect of a treaty may only be defeated by the amendment or the denuncia-
tion of the treaty.' 9 Another view accepted by federal courts in the
United States, but which is not to be found in any express provision of
the U.S. Constitution, is that a nation retains the power to modify by
municipal legislation the domestic effect of an international treaty (in the
United States referred to as the "last-in-time" doctrine) notwithstanding
that such modification has no effect on the international plane (in other
words, treaties and municipal legislation are pari passu).
The pari passu rule has become decidedly problematic as it has be-
come more widely accepted that international law may confer rights di-
rectly on the individuals residing within a state. In a Separate Opinion in
the Nuclear Tests Case (Australia and France)20 Judge Petren wrote:
In the relatively recent past, it was generally considered that the treat-
ment given by a State to its own subjects did not come within the pur-
view of international law. Even the most outrageous violations of
human rights committed by a State towards its own nationals could
not have formed the subject of an application by another State to an
international judicial organ .... It is only an evolution subsequent to
the Second World War which has made the duty of States to respect
the rights of all, including their own nationals, an obligation of interna-
tional law towards all States members of the international
community.21
If certain treaties-those, for example, dealing with fundamental human
rights-are themselves self-executing, or at least reflect customary inter-
national law norms which directly create rights in favor of individuals, 22
then it may be inconsistent with the notion of binding legal obligation to
permit municipal legislatures to modify those rights while maintaining
the guise of international legal responsibility.
18. See Administration de Douanes v. Societe Cafes Jacque Vabre, Cour de Cassation (Com-
bined Chamber), 2 C.M.L.R. 336, 368-69 (1975).
19. Id. at 360-62, Submissions of Procureur General.
20. I.C.J. Rep. 253 (1974).
21. Id. at 303.
22. Kirgis suggests that certain rules of customary international law may be self-executing,
stating: "The most obvious and most important of the potentially self-executing rules are many of
those protecting basic human rights. They benefit individuals directly, and they are specific enough
to be enforced judicially." Frederick L. Kirgis, Agora: May the President Violate Customary Interna-
tional Law? (con'd): Federal Statutes, Executive Orders and 'Self-Executing Custom, 81 AM. J. INT'L
L. 371, 372 (1987).
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B. The Status of Treaty Law in the US. Legal System
1. Article VI and Supreme Court Doctrine
According to the express terms of the Constitution, treaties are the
"supreme Law of the Land." 23 It is widely accepted that the Constitution
nevertheless takes precedence over a treaty, for example, that a treaty
may not be used to deprive a citizen of a constitutional right.24 Notwith-
standing the Supreme Court's holding on this point, the concern that a
treaty may be used to deprive a citizen of constitutional rights (or, per-
haps, to enhance federal constitutional rights in the face of powers re-
served to the States) has been a primary motivation for treaty
reservations adopted by the Senate. A treaty is superior to inconsistent
State law and to individual State constitutions.25 The Supreme Court has
held that a treaty supersedes a prior inconsistent federal statute and that
a subsequent inconsistent federal statute supersedes a treaty, giving rise
to the "last-in-time" doctrine.26
2. The Doctrine of Self-Executing Treaties
In Ware v. Hylton,27 decided in 1796, the U.S. Supreme Court held
that a provision in the Treaty of Peace with Great Britain making secure
the rights of British creditors nullified inconsistent law in the state of
Virginia without the further requirement of action by the Virginia legisla-
ture. The Court rejected the decision of the lower federal court which
had reasoned that because legislation would be required to implement the
treaty under British law, legislation by the individual states was required
to implement the treaty in the United States. Shortly thereafter, in Foster
v. Neilson and United States v. Percheman, Chief Justice Marshall articu-
lated a doctrine of self-executing treaties, in the latter case holding that
the treaty by which Spain ceded the Florida territories to the United
States directly stabilized certain land grants made by the King of Spain
prior to the time of the treaty and required no additional action by the
23. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursu-
ance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the
United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be
bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding.
24. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1223 (1957).
25. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
26. See Cherokee Tobacco Case, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 616 (1870); Head Money Cases, 112 U.S.
580 (1884); Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190 (1888); Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581
(1889).
27. 3 U.S. (3 Dali.) 199 (1796).
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U.S. Congress.28 The Court relied on the express language of the Treaty
of 1819 to determine that the United States and Spain intended the treaty
to have direct effect. In a recent case, Judge Mikva, writing for the Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, said:
This court has noted that, in 'determining whether a treaty is self-exe-
cuting' in the sense of its creating private enforcement rights, 'courts
look to the intent of the signatory parties as manifested by the lan-
guage of the instrument.' 29
C. The Treaty-Making Power and the Senate
The President is granted the express power to make treaties with the
advice and consent of the Senate, requiring the concurrence of two-thirds
of the Senators present. 30 This allocation of power is unique in the
American constitutional system in that it is the only area of unicameral
lawmaking, excluding participation by the House of Representatives. 31
It appears that the framers of the Constitution decided to exclude the
House of Representatives from a share of the treaty power on the
grounds that a large body would not be conducive to the secrecy and
dispatch required of the treaty process. 32 The Senate does not have the
power to compel the President to ratify a treaty or to modify its terms. If
the Senate disagrees with the President concerning a treaty, the sole
power of the Senate is to refuse to pass a resolution of ratification (or to
pass a resolution attaching conditions unacceptable to the President),
28. In Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829), Justice Marshall writing for the Court
held that the treaty was not self-executing because its terms appeared to call for a legislative act by
Congress. Yet, in United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51 (1833), Justice Marshall decided
that the treaty did not require a legislative act after considering the Spanish language text.
29. Comm. of United States Citizens Living in Nicaragua v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929, 937 (1988)
(citing Diggs v. Richardson, 555 F.2d 848, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1976)). Some U.S. courts have mistakenly
applied a unilateral intent test in deciding whether the terms of a treaty are self-executing, misappre-
hending the relationship between international and constitutional law as it applies to the question of
self-execution. See Riesenfeld, Win at Any Price?, supra note 13.
30. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2: "He [the President] shall have Power, by and with the Advice and
Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur."
Article I, § 5, of the Constitution provides that a majority of each House of Congress shall
constitute a quorum to do business. However, because Senate rules permit voting in the absence of a
quorum when the absence of a quorum is not "noticed," there have been occasions on which resolu-
tions of ratification have been passed by as few as three Senators (see Cong. Res. Study, supra note 1,
at 116-17).
31. In I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 954 (1983), the Supreme Court listed the constitutional
grant of the Senate treaty power as one of four provisions "by which one House may act alone with
the unreviewable force of law, not subject to the President's veto." Two of the other powers con-
cerned impeachment and one concerned Presidential appointments. Since the other unicameral pow-
ers involve discrete trials or appointment processes, we believe that the treaty power can fairly be
characterized as the only unicameral area of lawmaking as generally understood. It is of interest to
note that since the President may refuse to ratify a treaty after it has been approved by the Senate,
this might be considered a constructive veto power (though not subject to override).
32. See CRANDALL, supra note 1, at 43-48, 53-63 and Cong. Res. Study, supra note 1, at 25-30.
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thereby preventing the President from ratifying it.33
The Constitution provides no unicameral legislative power to the
Senate outside of its power to consent to the making of treaties. 34 All
bills are passed by the Senate and the House of Representatives and
thereafter become law by signature or acquiescence of the President (or
are vetoed by the President, which veto may then be overridden and a
law enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives acting together
each by two-thirds majority).35 In LN.S. v. Chadha 36 the Supreme Court
held that legislation which reserved to the Senate or House of Represent-
atives the right to veto an Executive branch decision, thereby "altering
the legal rights, duties, and relations of persons" 37 was unconstitutional
because it conferred a legislative power on one House of Congress and
avoided the possibility of a veto by the President.
Since the founding of the republic, it has been accepted practice that
the President initiates and conducts the negotiation of treaties, bringing a
signed or otherwise final draft to the Senate for its advice and consent.
Only once did a President (Washington) personally visit the Senate for
negotiating advice, with notoriously poor results. Members of the Senate
make suggestions to the President concerning areas in which treaties
might be fruitfully explored, are consulted by Executive branch repre-
sentatives during the negotiating process, 38 and particularly in recent
times, members of Congress have not infrequently acted as members of
or advisers to the U.S. delegation negotiating a treaty.39
The U.S. Department of State maintains as a part of its Foreign
Affairs Manual instructions to the Foreign Service with regard to the
negotiation and conclusion of treaties and other international agree-
ments. These instructions are referred to as the "Circular 175 Proce-
33. See Cong. Res. Study, supra note 1, at 125-26 n.46. The Study notes a prior Congressional
Research Service study, which listed 38 treaties that were approved by the Senate with reservations
that did not enter into force as a result of the reservations, but which did not distinguish between
reservations which were unacceptable to the President and reservations unacceptable to other treaty
parties.
34. See discussion of I.N.S. v. Chadha, supra note 31, noting that the Senate has a unicameral
power to try cases of impeachment and approve appointments.
35. U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 5, 7.
36. 462 U.S. 917 (1983).
37. Id. at 952.
38. See Cong. Res. Study, supra note 1, at 91-98.
39. Although this is a practice of long standing, it increased after the Second World War be-
cause, among other reasons, the Senate's attachment of conditions to ratification unacceptable to
President Wilson and the consequent failure of the U.S. to ratify the Treaty of Versailles was par-
tially attributed to the absence of Senators on the American delegation. See Cong. Res. Study, supra
note 1, at 98-99.
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dure."4 The Procedure has, among other purposes, the intent to insure
that the Senate (or Congress as appropriate) is consulted with respect to
impending, ongoing and concluded treaty negotiations. 41 The Procedure
sets forth criteria for determining whether the advice and consent of the
Senate will be sought with respect to a particular treaty, without specify-
ing that any particular factor is determinative. 42 A Foreign Service Of-
ficer's request for authorization to negotiate or sign must indicate what
arrangements are planned as to congressional consultation and public
comment. 43 With respect to negotiations, congressional leaders and
committees are to be kept informed and consulted, "including especially
whether any legislation is considered necessary or desirable for the imple-
mentation of the new treaty or agreement." 44 The Procedure requires
diligence in complying with the provisions of the Case Act4 5 which re-
quires that the text of any international agreement other than a treaty to
which the United States is a party be transmitted to the Congress within
60 days after entry into force."
After a treaty has been negotiated by the Executive branch, it is
transmitted to the Senate for its advice and consent. In the Senate, trea-
ties are referred to the Foreign Relations Committee which has exclusive
40. Circular 175 Procedures, Treaties and other International Agreements, Chapter 700, 11
FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANuAL, Revised October 25, 1974 [hereinafter Circular 175].
41. In addition, the Procedure seeks to insure: "That where, in the opinion of the Secretary of
State or his designee, the circumstances permit, the public be given an opportunity to comment on
treaties and other international agreements." Id. § 720.2(d).
42. The Circular 175 Procedure requires that "due consideration is given to the following fac-
tors" in addition to those referred to in the Constitution itself-
a. The extent to which the agreement involves commitments or risks affecting the nation
as a whole;
b. Whether the agreement is intended to affect State laws;
c. Whether the agreement can be given effect without the enactment of subsequent legis-
lation by Congress;
d. Past U.S. practice as to similar agreements;
e. The preference of the Congress as to a particular type of agreement;
f. The degree of formality desired for an agreement;
g. The proposed duration of the agreement, the need for prompt conclusion of an agree-
ment, and the desirability of concluding a routine or short-term agreement; and
h. The general international practice as to similar agreements. In determining whether
any international agreement should be brought into force as a treaty or as an international
agreement other than a treaty, the utmost care is to be exercised to avoid any invasion or
compromise of the constitutional powers of the Senate, the Congress as a whole, or the
President.
Id. § 721.3.
43. Id. § 722.3(c).
44. Id. § 723. 1(e).
45. Pub. L. No. 92-403, 1 U.S.C. § 112(b).
46. Unless national security requirements dictate that they be transmitted to the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee and Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives under an ap-
propriate injunction of secrecy. Id
[V/ol. 67:571
THE SCOPE OF SENATE CONTROL
jurisdiction over treaties.47 The Foreign Relations Committee holds
hearings in which, among other things, it receives testimony from Execu-
tive branch witnesses. The Committee then prepares a report on the
treaty and votes whether or not to recommend a resolution of ratification
to the full Senate. The recommendation of the Committee may contain
proposed amendments and conditions, that is, reservations, understand-
ings, declarations or provisos. The Senate then considers the treaty under
Rule 30 of the Senate Rules which, however, is usually abbreviated. If
the Rule 30 procedure is not abbreviated, then the treaty is first consid-
ered for amendment article by article by the Senate first sitting as a Com-
mittee of the Whole, and the Senate thereafter sitting as the Senate must
again vote on each proposed amendment. After the Senate has voted on
amendments, the Senate then proceeds to consider conditions to the reso-
lution of ratification (proposals by the Foreign Relations Committee
being considered first), and thereafter to vote on the resolution of ratifica-
tion itself (which will at the final stage set forth any agreed to amend-
ments and conditions).
If the Rule 30 procedure is abbreviated, the Senate first considers
the treaty as a whole and votes on any proposed amendments which are
offered. The Senate then considers the resolution of ratification reported
by the Foreign Relations Committee (including any proposed conditions)
and any additional conditions proposed. The Senate finally votes on the
resolution of ratification. The only vote which requires a two-thirds ma-
jority of members present is on the resolution of ratification itself. All
other votes are by majority. 48
Following a favorable vote by the Senate, the President may proceed
to ratify a treaty, provided that conditions properly attached to the reso-
lution of ratification are fulfilled (for example, by their incorporation in
the instrument of ratification). The President then proclaims the treaty.49
47. Under current Rule 25 of the Senate Rules of Procedure. See Cong. Res. Study, supra note
1, at 106.
48. For a detailed discussion of Senate procedures, see Cong. Res. Study, supra, note i, at 104-
118. The Senate may require that a treaty be amended prior to ratification. The Congressional Re-
search Study suggests that in the case of bilateral treaties there is little substantive difference between
amendments and reservations and that either amounts to a counter-offer. On the other hand, "'[i]n
the case of large, multilateral agreements, amendments are seldom realistic." Id. at 109. Neverthe-
less, the choice between amendment and reservation may become significant in cases where the party
requires a plebiscite. See discussion of the treaty with Panama, Riesenfeld, International Agreements,
supra note 3, and infra text accompanying notes 236-41.
49. There is no express constitutional or general statutory requirement that a treaty be pro-
claimed by the President in order to have domestic effect. However, it has been Executive branch
custom to issue a proclamation following ratification of treaties which have received the advice and
consent of the Senate, but not to issue a proclamation with respect to Executive agreements unless
specifically required by statute. The federal courts have not ruled on the significance of the procla-
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Because it is impacted by these other areas, discussion of the power of the
Senate to attach reservations and understandings to international treaties
follows discussion of the powers to execute and interpret.
D. The Powers to Execute and Interpret
The power to execute the laws of the United States is conferred by
the Constitution on the President.5" Since a treaty is the law of the land,
it is the President's role to carry out its terms without reliance on his
independent foreign affairs powers.51 However, it is readily apparent that
the President's mandate is constitutionally constrained by the role of the
Congress as a whole. First, only Congress may authorize the expenditure
of public funds, 52 and so to the extent that the execution of a treaty re-
quires such expenditure, the Congress will have a check on the Presi-
dent's execution authority. Second, to the extent that execution of a
treaty requires the promulgation of law, only the Congress has the au-
thority to make the laws of the United States.53 In sum, the treaty execu-
tion power is vested in the President, with significant checks and balances
in the hands of the Congress.
The power to interpret is directly corollary to the execution power
and therefore must, in the first instance, reside with the President. Thus,
in the execution of treaties the President will as a matter of course exer-
cise the interpretative power.54 However, the Supreme Court has the final
mation (except in the very narrow context of the effective date of a treaty which expressly required a
proclamation to take effect). See generally, Henry Reiff, The Proclaiming of Treaties in the United
States, 30 AM. J. INT'L L. 63 (1936); Henry Reiff, Proclaiming of Treaties in the United States, 44
AM. J. INT'L L. 572 (1950). There is a statutory requirement that the Secretary of State cause to be
published all treaties and other international agreements to which the United States is a party in
United States Treaties and Other International Agreements which "shall be legal evidence" of the
treaties in all courts in the United States. 1 U.S.C. § 112(a). It is doubtful that this publication is a
prerequisite of the domestic effectiveness of a treaty if for no other reason than that the State Depart-
ment is many years behind in its publication obligation. Treaties in Force, an index of current treaties
to which the United States is a party, also is published by the State Department and is kept up to
date.
50. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, provides that: "The executive Power shall be vested in a President
of the United States of America."
51. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 4, § 1, reporter's note 2 and § 326, cmt. a; Coplin v. United
States, 6 Ct. Cl. 115, 136 (1984), rev'd on other grounds, 761 F.2d 688 (Fed. Cir.1985), aff'd sub
nom. O'Connor v. United States, 479 U.S. 27 (1986), stating "the Executive Branch generally has
administrative authority over the implementation of international agreements."
52. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9: "No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence
of Appropriations made by Law .... "
53. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1: "All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress
of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives."
Of course, this power does not act as a constraint with respect to self-executing treaties. About
proclamation of treaties, see Reiff, supra note 49.
54. See, e.g., Sumitomo Shoji of America, Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 184-85 (1982); Ko-
lovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187, 194 (1961); Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 295 (1933), cited
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power to interpret treaties under Article III of the Constitution," and
public or private claimants desiring to challenge the President's interpre-
tation of the law of the land embodied in a treaty have the right to plead
their case in the courts.56 It may well be that these claimants will be
found by the courts to lack a justiciable interest in a particular treaty
because, for example, it deals with a foreign affairs function exercisable
by the President in his or her discretion.57 Nevertheless, it is for the
courts to decide that an interest is nonjusticiable. The ultimate judicial
power with respect to treaties is expressly allocated to the Supreme Court
and in the U.S. constitutional system, in which treaties are part of the
supreme law of the land, treaty interpretation is manifestly a judicial
in Coplin v. United States, 6 Ct. Cl. at 136, in support of proposition that Executive branch interpre-
tation of treaties is entitled to significant deference as the Executive is responsible for negotiation and
administrative implementation of treaties, noting, however, that "deference... is not the same as
blind acceptance." See also RESTATEMENT, supra note 4, § 326(1).
55. See Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. 1 (1899). U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 1, provides: "The judicial
Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as
the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, provides: "The
judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the
Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority .. "
The U.S. State Department has so advised foreign governments. See Aide Memoire from Un-
dersecretary of State Phillips to German Ambassador (1933) as quoted by Court of Claims in Coplin,
6 Ct. Cl. at 136, n.20. See also RESTATEMENT, supra note 4, § 326(2).
Courts and the Executive may disagree on the self-executing nature of a treaty, as e.g. in the
case of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, see United States v. Enger, 472 F. Supp.
490 (D.N.J. 1978). Similar situations exist in the United States and the Federal Republic of Ger-
many regarding the domestic status of the Vienna Conventions on Diplomatic and Consular Rela-
tions. The draftsmanship of the Diplomatic Relations Act (22 U.S.C. §§ 254a-254e) is predicated on
the view that the Conventions are self-executing, and the provisions of the Convention on Diplo-
matic Relations regarding privileges and immunities are made applicable to non-parties (22 U.S.C.
§ 254b). In Germany, the Vienna Conventions on Diplomatic and Consular Relations, ratified pur-
suant to two "approval laws," are, in so far as the provisions on immunities are concerned, self-
executing with respect to the parties to the convention and made applicable to non-parties by virtue
of Articles 18 and 19 of the Law on the Organization of Courts. For an interesting case holding that
surveillance of a telephone line installed in the Turkish Consulate General in Hamburg violates the
directly applicable convention and prevents use of the information thus obtained, see Order of the
Supreme Court of Germany in Criminal Matters of 4.4.1990, BGH St. 36, 396 = NJW 1990, 1799;
noted in Giegerich, Deutsche Rechtsprechung in volkerrechtlichen, Fragen 1990, 52 Za6RV, 335 at
381 (1992).
56. A claimant may bring an action in state as well as federal court challenging a federal Execu-
tive branch interpretation of a treaty, because the state courts generally have concurrent jurisdiction
to hear claims involving federal and treaty law. But issues of interpretation regarding federal and
treaty law are ultimately subject to review by the Supreme Court. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 4,
§ 326(2) cmt. d.
57. See Holmes v. Laird, 459 F.2d 1211, 1223 (D.C. Cir. 1972), and especially cases cited at
note 26.
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function. 5s
E. Reservations and Other Conditions of the U.S. Senate
Because the Constitution expressly vests in the Senate the power to
give the requisite consent to the President's ratification of treaties5 9 it has
traditionally been assumed that the Senate has the power to consent with
58. In this article we will not discuss allocation of the power to terminate treaties beyond the
following.
The Constitution does not expressly address the termination of treaties. There are three mecha-
nisms apparent, each of which has been used to effect termination:
1. The President acting alone, with or without informal consultation with the Senate or Con-
gress;
2. The President acting with the advice and consent of two-thirds of the Senators present-
thereby replicating the treaty-making process; and
3. Termination by the President acting upon joint resolution of Congress.
Following President Carter's notice of intent to terminate the 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty
between Taiwan and the United States in conjunction with formal recognition of the Government of
the PRC, a number of Senators and members of the House of Representatives brought suit in federal
court to enjoin the termination. The District Court issued an injunction holding that termination of
a treaty requires authorization either by two-thirds of the Senate or a majority of both Houses of
Congress. Goldwater v. Carter, 481 F. Supp. 949 (D.D.C. 1979). The Court of Appeals, sitting en
banc, reversed in Goldwater v. Carter, 617 F.2d 697, 708 (D.C. Cir. 1979), holding that in the
absence of a role for the Senate or Congress spelled out in the Constitution, or a specific provision in
the treaty itself, "lt]hat power [to terminate] consequently devolves upon the President, and there is
no basis for a court to imply a restriction on the President's power to terminate not contained in the
Constitution, in this treaty, or in any other authoritative source." Interestingly, the Court of Ap-
peals made the suggestion, but did not decide, that the Senate might have restricted the President's
authority by the attachment of a condition to its consent to ratification. Id. at 699, 709.
The Supreme Court (without oral argument) vacated the judgment of the Court of Appeals and
remanded with instructions to dismiss the complaint, Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979).
Justice Brennan dissented and would have affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals. Justices
Blackmun and White dissented in part and would have heard oral argument on the case. Two con-
curring opinions were filed (one joined by four Justices and one filed individually) and Justice Mar-
shall concurred in the result without filing or joining an opinion. The opinion for four, written by
Justice Rehnquist, considered the case to involve a political question and therefore to be nonjusticia-
ble. Congress was portrayed as possessing the constitutionally allocated resources necessary to pro-
tect and assert its interests in a test of will with the President. Justice Powell, writing individually,
considered the case not ripe for judicial review because, in his view, neither the Senate nor Congress
had taken the formal steps required to challenge the President's authority.
The RESTATEMENT expresses the view that the President may terminate a treaty on his or her
own authority as an incident of the power to conduct foreign relations. RESrATEMENT, supra note
4, § 339 cmt. a. However, the RESTATEMENT suggests that the Senate may with binding effect con-
dition its consent to a treaty by requiring the consent of the Senate or Congress to its termination. Id.
at cmt. a. McDougal and Reisman have expressed a strong preference for approval of termination by
joint Congressional resolution (while recognizing that compelling circumstances may require in-
dependent Presidential action). See Michael Reisman & Myres S. McDougal, Who Can Terminate
Mutual Defense Treaties?, NAT'L L. J., May 21, 1979, at 19. One of the authors of this article has
suggested that the "most logical view is that the power to denounce a treaty is vested in the President
by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, so that the department of the government which
makes the treaty can terminate it," recognizing that three mechanisms have been used in practice.
Stefan A. Riesenfeld, The Power of Congress and the President in International Relations, supra note
1, at 660. But he now believes that the Pesident may act alone, if the treaty provides for termination
by denunciation.
59. The Senate does not itself ratify a treaty, but rather passes a resolution of ratification au-
thorizing the President to ratify. Reservations, understandings and declarations are included in the
(Vol. 67:571
THE SCOPE OF SENATE CONTROL
conditions.60 Senate practice has denominated qualifications or condi-
tions in at least four ways, although some confusion surrounds the in-
tended effect of the differently labelled conditions. A Report of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the Salt II Treaty (which was
not ratified) explained three of the conditions as follows:
Reservation-a limitation, qualification, or contradiction of the
obligations in a treaty, especially as they relate to the party making the
reservation;
Understanding-an interpretation, clarification, or elaboration as-
sumed to be consistent with the obligations of the treaty as submitted;
Declaration-a statement of policy, purpose, or position related
to the subject matter of the treaty but not necessarily affecting its
provisions.61
The fourth label, "proviso," applies to conditions which, in the words of
a Congressional Research Service Study:
are not intended to be included in the formal instruments of ratifica-
tion because they do not involve the other parties to the treaty but
relate instead to issues of U.S. law or procedure. In recent years the
term 'proviso' has been adopted by the Foreign Relations Committee
and the Senate to apply to this type of condition, which is placed in a
separate section of the Senate's resolution of ratification. 62
We will consider examples of each of these types of conditions and their
legal effect under international and municipal law. However, we will use
the label "understanding" to refer generally to both "understandings"
and "declarations" since both are intended to be incorporated in an in-
Senate's resolution of ratification and transmitted to the President for inclusion in the instrument of
ratification (or where otherwise appropriate).
60. The Senate consented to the Jay Treaty of 1794 only after an amendment it demanded was
incorporated in the treaty. 8 Stat. 116 (1794); 1 MALLOY, TREAriEs (U.S.) 590, 607 (1910). See
William W. Bishop, Jr., Reservations to Treaties, in II RECUEIL DES CouRs 245, 260-61 (1961).
61. S. EXEC. REP. No. 14, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. at 34 (1979).
62. Cong. Res. Study, supra note 1, at 110-11. Following an expression of dissatisfaction with
the Executive's handling of certain Senate declarations relating to a 1976 bilateral treaty with Spain,
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, in reporting a subsequently proposed (but never ratified)
SALT II treaty with the Soviet Union, recommended the following three types of conditions:
Category I: provisions that do not directly involve formal notice to or agreement by the
Soviet Union.
Category II: provisions that would be formally communicated to the Soviet Union as
official statements of the position of the United States Government in ratifying the Treaty,
but which do not require their agreement.
Category III: provisions that would require the explicit agreement of the Soviet Union
for the Treaty to come into force.
Although these categories have not been reflected in formal U.S. treaty practice, see RESTATEMENT,
supra note 4, § 314, reporter's note 1, they are sometimes referred to in Senate Foreign Relations
Committee hearings. See The CFE Treaty: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on European Affairs of the
Comm. on Foreign Relations, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 67-68 (1991) (Senator Dodd and Secretary of
State Baker).
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strument of ratification and neither is intended to modify a legal
obligation.
The Senate presently attaches reservations, understandings and
other conditions to treaties referred to it for advice and consent as a mat-
ter of routine. We surveyed all treaties entered into by the United States
(as printed in the official State Department publication United States
Treaties and Other International Agreements) from the year 1970 (21
UST 1, TIAS 6813) through the most current published year, 1987 (-
UST - , TIAS 11100).63 Of 221 treaties listed for that period which had
been submitted to the Senate for its advice and consent, 33 (or 17.5 per-
cent) were consented to with one or more conditions." Putting aside
questions regarding the frequency of the Senate's conditional consent, the
practice with respect to the human rights commitments of the United
States has become a matter of specific and serious concern, both domesti-
cally and internationally.
1. Reservations in International Law65
According to the Vienna Convention, a reservation is a unilateral
statement in any form made by a party when ratifying, acceding to or
adhering to a treaty by which it purports to exclude or modify a legal
obligation otherwise imposed by the treaty.66 A reservation is valid and
effective so long as it does not purport to defeat the object and purpose of
the treaty, it is not precluded by the terms of the treaty, and it is not
objected to in a timely manner by another party to the treaty.67 An objec-
tion by a party to a reservation has the effect of excluding the portion of
the treaty as to which the reservation is made and as to which an objec-
tion is filed, or in an appropriate case of precluding the entry into force of
the treaty as between the reserving and objecting parties.68 Resei-vations
and objections thereto affect only those parties to whom they are ad-
dressed and do not affect the nature of the treaty obligations as between
other parties. 69
The Vienna Convention does not separately address reservations
63. Of the 4278 international agreements (treaties and other executive agreements) listed for the
stated period, only 221 (or 5.2 percent) had been submitted to the Senate for its advice and consent.
64. The fact that relatively few treaties are submitted to the Senate means that as a percentage
of all treaty commitments of the United States, the number which incorporate conditions attached
by the Senate is comparatively small (approximately .8%).
65. See generally Bishop, supra note 60.
66. Vienna Convention, supra note 7, at art. 2(lXd).
67. Id. at art. 19.
68. Id. at art. 20.
69. Id. at art. 21.
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and objections to multilateral and bilateral treaties, although the context
in which such reservations and objections are made is decidedly different.
In the bilateral context a reservation must be viewed as virtually the
equivalent of an amendment to the treaty because it clearly affects the
rights and obligations of the only parties to the treaty and does not leave
rights of other parties unaffected. A bilateral treaty which is the subject
of both a reservation and an objection should normally not be binding as
there would to be an absence of mutuality of consent as to the treaty
terms. 70
Reservations to international treaties and objections thereto have
been the subject of a number of important decisions by international ad-
judicatory bodies. Prior to the Advisory Opinion of the International
Court of Justice with respect to Reservations to the Genocide Conven-
tion7 1 the law concerning reservations to multilateral treaties was unset-
tled: some advocating that a state could not adhere to a treaty with a
reservation unless that reservation was expressly assented to by all par-
ties to the treaty, and others advocating that adherence with a reserva-
tion did not require universal assent, provided that the reservation itself
might be excluded by objection or otherwise.72 The I.C.J. opined that
adherence to a treaty with a reservation does not require universal assent,
provided that the reservation may be excluded (or adherence defeated)
under certain circumstances.
A second important decision was that of the Court of Arbitration in
the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf between the United Kingdom
and France.73 In that case the French had filed certain reservations to the
Continental Shelf Treaty of 1958 as to which the United Kingdom had
entered objections. The panel held that the effect of a reservation and
corresponding objection was to preclude the effect as between the parties
of only that specific portion of a treaty article as to which the parties had
failed to agree, without affecting the rights and obligations of the parties
under other parts of the treaty or under unaffected portions of the spe-
cific article as to which reservation was made.
A third important statement on the law of reservations is contained
70. See discussion of bilateral treaties, infra text accompanying notes 233-41.
71. Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Geno-
cide, 1950 I.CJ. 14-69 (25 May 1951).
72. The concern of those recommending against a universal assent requirement was that the
requirement would preclude widespread adherence to multilateral treaties, see FRANK HoRN, RES-
ERVATIONS AND INTERPRETATIVE DECLARATIONS TO MULTILATERAL TREATIES 14-21 (1988),
and would give an effective veto to each country. See Bishop, supra note 60, at 274-93.
73. 18 United Nations Rep. of Int'l Arbitral Awards 3 (1979).
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in a dissenting opinion by Judge Lauterpacht in the Interhandel case74
between Switzerland and the United States. In his dissenting opinion,
Judge Lauterpacht considered at length the reservation which the United
States attached to its acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the
International Court of Justice (ICJ). The United States sought by its res-
ervation to reserve for itself the right to determine what matters fell ex-
clusively within the domestic jurisdiction of the United States and so not
to be justiciable by the ICJ. Judge Lauterpacht opined that such a reser-
vation by the United States defeated its acceptance of compulsory juris-
diction by giving it the right to act as judge in its own case. Judge
Lauterpacht dismissed the notion of good faith as a restraint on the dis-
cretion of the United States by noting the impracticability of ICJ inquir-
ies into the good faith of states.
A recent decision by the European Court of Human Rights in the
case of Belilos v. Switzerland,75 highlights the importance of legal issues
surrounding reservations. In this case Mrs. Belilos took issue with a
Swiss statement accompanying its adherence to the European Conven-
tion on Human Rights (ECHR) which the Swiss government contended
preserved its right to employ certain administrative procedures in the
determination of minor criminal infractions. The procedure in question
involved decisions of fact and law by a Swiss administrative officer for-
merly connected with the police authorities. The Court first had to con-
sider whether the Swiss statement in question constituted a reservation as
a matter of international law in light of the fact that the Swiss had de-
scribed the statement as an interpretative declaration. The Court held, in
conformity with the Vienna Convention, that the title of the Swiss state-
ment was not determinative, and that the Swiss statement was in fact
intended to modify Switzerland's obligations under the treaty, thereby
constituting a reservation. The Court went on to hold that because the
ECHR expressly forbade reservations of a general character, and because
the Swiss reservation attempted to preserve all administrative proceed-
ings which permitted eventual recourse on questions of law to judicial
bodies, the Swiss reservation was inconsistent with the express terms of
the ECHR and therefore invalid. The Swiss reservation was also held to
have failed to conform with an express requirement of the ECHR that a
list be included of laws intended to be affected by a reservation. The
Court applied the European Convention to Switzerland without the inva-
lid reservation. The court's decision to nullify the reservation and apply
74. Switzerland v. United States (The Interhandel Case), 1959 I.C.J. Rep. 6.
75. 10 Eur. R. Rep. 466 (1988).
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the treaty to Switzerland in toto was the first such decision by an interna-
tional tribunal and of considerable significance with respect to the inter-
national law of treaties and treaty reservations. 76
2. Reservations in the Municipal Law of the United States
A treaty is an international legal instrument governed by interna-
tional law. 77 Treaties are the law of the land in the United States,7 8 as is
customary international law.79 Treaties must therefore be interpreted and
applied in accordance with the applicable rules of international law. Jus-
tice Stevens, in a dissenting opinion in Trans World Airlines v. Franklin
Mint Corp.,80 wrote:
The great object of an international agreement is to define the common
ground between sovereign nations. Given the gulfs of language, cul-
ture, and values that separate nations, it is essential in international
agreements for the parties to make explicit their common ground on
the most rudimentary of matters. The frame of reference in interpret-
ing treaties is naturally international, and not domestic. Accordingly,
the law of nations is always to be consulted in the interpretation of
treaties. The Pizarro, 2 Wheat. 227, 246 (1817). See also Santovincenzo
v. Egan, 284 U.S. 30, 40 (1931) ('As treaties are contracts between
independent nations, their words are to be taken in their ordinary
meaning "as understood in the public law of nations" ')[citations omit-
ted]; Society for the Propagation of the Gospel in Foreign Parts v. New
Haven, 8 Wheat. 464, 490 (1823). Constructions of treaties yielding
parochial variations in their implementation are anathema to the
raison d'etre of treaties, and hence to the rules of construction applica-
ble to them.
The basic notion that a treaty is an international instrument governed by
international law leads us inexorably to the conclusion that a reservation
which is not valid under international law has no independent validity in
United States law because an invalid reservation is not part of a treaty.
The U.S. Senate (acting with the President who must concur in the act of
the Senate by incorporating its reservation in an instrument of ratifica-
tion) does not have a constitutionally mandated power to unicamerally
adopt rules applicable to the United States or its citizens merely because
the Senate purports to act under the treaty power. It is, in our view, a
constitutional requirement that Senate reservations (assented to by the
76. See the contribution by Professor Wildhaber to this symposium. Luzius Wildhaber, Parlia-
mentary Participation in Treaty-making: Report on Swiss Law, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 437, 453-57
(1991).
77. Vienna Convention, supra note 7, at art. 2(1)(a) and RESTATEMENT, supra note 4, at
§ 301(1).
78. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
79. See The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
80. 466 U.S. 243, 261 (1984).
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President in the ratification process) be a valid part of a treaty instrument
under international law in order to have domestic legal effect.
The Supreme Court has recognized the power of the Senate to con-
sent to the making of a bilateral treaty with an amendment or modifica-
tion. 81 In Power Authority of New York v. FPC,82 the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit held that a Senate reservation of
purely municipal concern was without legal effect (see discussion infra),
but did not question the Senate's underlying power to adopt and attach
reservations to its resolutions of ratification. The federal courts do not
appear to have had occasion to consider the validity and legal effect of
Senate understandings attached to instruments of ratification. In Holmes
v. Laird,8 3 a case involving the NATO Status of Forces Agreement, the
Court of Appeals noted that appellant's failure to plead a defect in U.S.
government compliance with a "sense of the Senate" resolution included
in an instrument of ratification (which concerned Executive branch pro-
cedures with respect to criminal prosecutions in foreign contracting
states) obviated the need to address the issue. The courts do not appear
to have questioned the validity of a U.S. treaty because the instrument of
ratification incorporates a Senate understanding. 84
The Supreme Court has held that a Senate resolution purporting to
interpret a treaty adopted after an exchange of instruments of ratification
was "absolutely without legal significance on the question" at issue.85
The Supreme Court also has held that certain amendments which the
Senate had attached to its resolution of ratification but which had not
been communicated to the other party were not part of an otherwise
valid treaty.8 6 These decisions suggest a recognition by the Court that
Senate pronouncements which do not have international legal signifi-
cance would likewise lack domestic legal significance.
Since the mid-1950s at least, Professor Henkin advanced the argu-
ment that the Senate has a constitutionally-based power, arising out of its
express power of advice and consent to the making of treaties, to attach
reservations or other conditions to its consent to ratification which may
be either without consequence on the international plane or, at least in
81. Haver v. Yaker, 9 U.S. (Wall.) 32, 35 (1869).
82. 247 F. 2d 538 (D.C. Cir. 1957), vacated and remanded with instructions to dismiss as moot
sub nom. American Pub. Power Ass'n v. Power Auth., 355 U.S. 64 (1957).
83. 459 F.2d 1211 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
84. The Panama Canal Treaties, for example, include understandings. The federal courts have
interpreted the treaties on many occasions, but have not questioned the Senate's authority to require
the attachment of understandings in its resolution of ratification.
85. Fourteen Diamond Rings v. United States, 183 U.S. 176, 178-80 (1901).
86. New York Indians v. United States, 170 U.S. 1 (1898).
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the case of an understanding, contrary to the international meaning of a
treaty, but which nevertheless must be given effect by U.S. courts.87 The
foundation of this view is that if the Senate has the power to withhold its
consent to the making of a treaty for any reason - good, bad or indiffer-
ent - then it must have a corollary power to condition its consent, even
if that basis may in effect grant a power to the Senate not elsewhere
ascribed to it in the Constitution." Professor Henkin has long suggested
that there may be some inherent limitations on this Senate power, such as
to prohibit its use in manifest bad faith, and has recently suggested that
the Senate may not by an understanding deprive the President of his or
her constitutional authority. 9 Insofar as we are aware, Professor Henkin
has never written that the Senate may attach a reservation to a treaty
contrary to international law and yet cause that reservation to be
mandatorily applied by U.S. courts. Nevertheless, his view that the Sen-
ate's power of advice and consent may be practically unlimited from a
municipal constitutional law perspective might be understood (or per-
haps rather misunderstood) to justify that result.
Professor Henkin's 1952 article on the reservation power of the U.S.
Senate concerned a reservation attached to a treaty with Canada which
set forth rules for the development of the Niagara water resources. 90 The
reservation at issue sought to reserve to the Congress as a whole the
power to decide the manner in which the Niagara resources would be
developed by the United States, as a purely domestic matter, when in the
absence of the reservation development would have been governed by
existing federal legislation. There was consensus among the U.S. and Ca-
nadian governments, as well as advocates on both sides of the reservation
issue, that the U.S. reservation dealt with a purely internal matter.
The first question was whether the reservation was a proper part of
the treaty under international law, and therefore part of the municipal
law of the United States, or alternatively invalid under international law
and therefore not a part of U.S. law. Professor Henkin argued that a
treaty may well contain provisions relating solely to the domestic
processes of one of the parties without invalidating the treaty or the sub-
87. This view with respect to reservations was first and most comprehensively stated in Henkin,
The Niagara Power Reservation, supra note 3. It is elaborated on in Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the
Constitution, supra note 1, at 160-61. Professor Henkin's view of the Senate's purported power to
control treaty interpretation is discussed infra text accompanying notes 181-83.
88. See, e.g., Henkin, The Niagra Power Reservation, supra note 3, at 1177.
89. In a recent article, Professor Henkin observed that the Senate by attaching a "constitutional
principle" as a condition of consent to a treaty does not bind a President to that principle. Henkin,
Treaties in a Constitutional Democracy, supra note 3, at 417.
90. See American Pub. Power Ass'n v. Power Auth., 355 U.S. 64 (1957).
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ject provision. He reasoned that if a party would only consent to the
making of a treaty with a particular clause, it must have considered the
matter of some significance to its bargain and therefore a condition of its
consent. If the other party agreed to inclusion of the subject provision in
the treaty, as a reservation or part of the text, it should be considered a
valid part of the instrument under international law. Professor Henkin
acknowledged that there may well be some limit on the power of states to
include matters unrelated to the subject matter of the treaty under inter-
national law, but suggested that this limitation would not affect provi-
sions which, while related to the subject matter of the treaty, were of
purely municipal concern to one party.
The Vienna Convention expressly deals with the proper subject mat-
ter of a treaty by excluding treaties conflicting with a preemptory norm
of international law (/us cogens)91 from the scope of acceptable subject
matter.92 The fact that a treaty is defined by the Vienna Convention as an
"international agreement concluded between States... governed by in-
ternational law" 93 doubtless also implies additional subject matter limita-
tion, for example, that a treaty deal with a matter of international
concern. Nonetheless, the drafters of the Vienna Convention chose not to
further specify subject matter limitation, recognizing the flexible nature
of the treaty instrument and the continually evolving nature of the inter-
national legal system. 94 The controversy concerning the particular status
of the Niagara Power reservation as a part of the treaty involves a ques-
tion of international law which we need not attempt to answer at this
juncture. 95 Professor Henkin's first argument was that the reservation
was a valid part of the treaty and was therefore the law of the United
States. We agree that, to the extent the reservation was indeed valid
under international law, then it was likewise part of the law of the United
States binding on the courts.
91. Vienna Convention, supra note 7, at art. 53.
92. The Vienna Convention also disfavors treaties procured by the threat or use of force in
violation of the principles embodied in the U.N. Charter. Vienna Convention, supra note 7, at art.
52. However, this is not a subject matter limitation, but rather a limitation as to procedure.
93. Id. at art. 2(l)(a).
94. See, e.g., Report by Sir Hirsch Lauterpacht, Special Rapporteur, Law of Treaties, Vol II,
1953 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 90, 93-105, observing both with respect to form and substance, that the
scope of the definition of a treaty should be broad. See also Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties
with Commentaries, Adopted by the International Law Commission at its Eighteenth Session, U.N.
Conf. on Law of Treaties, Documents of the Conference, 1st and 2nd Sessions, 1968-69, p. 8, refer-
ring to "treaty" as a "generic term covering all forms of international agreement in writing con-
cluded between States."
95. That question is, of course, whether a reservation relating to the subject matter of a treaty,
but solely regulating a matter of domestic concern to one of the parties, may be considered a part of
the treaty.
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This proposition is reflected in the Restatement, which provides at
section 314, Comment d: "If a treaty is ratified or acceded to by the
United States with a reservation effective under the principles stated in
[sec.] 313, the reservation is part of the treaty and is law of the United
States" [emphasis added]. Section 313 sets forth the generally accepted
criteria for evaluating the effectiveness of reservations as codified in the
Vienna Convention and under customary international law. By expressly
recognizing that only reservations effective under principles of interna-
tional law are part of a treaty and therefore part of the law of the United
States, the Restatement would appear, at first blush at least, to support
the conclusion that a reservation adopted by the Senate and attached to a
treaty does not have an independent validity under U.S. domestic law.
The second question was whether, assuming the Niagara Power res-
ervation was not a valid part of the treaty because not of international
concern, the Senate nevertheless possessed an independent power under
the Constitution to legislate with domestic effect under the treaty power
such as to make the status of the reservation under international law
beside the point. Professor Henkin proposed that the Niagara Power res-
ervation was binding within the United States even if it was not a part of
the treaty. He contended that the "treaty power contains an important if
limited right to legislate domestically to affect domestic rights and inter-
ests."' 96 He said:
If, as is agreed, the constitutional requirement of Senate concurrence
implies a power in the Senate to impose a condition to ratification
which constitutes a 'reservation' in a special international law sense,
why is the Senate precluded from imposing as a 'reservation' to its
consent a condition relating to the domestic consequences of the
treaty? If the Senate can withhold consent for no reason, or for any
bad reason, perhaps it can give its consent on any condition whatever.
For present purposes it is not necessary to decide what would be the
effect if an irresponsible Senate sought to extract from the President, or
from the Congress, as the price of its consent, conditions unrelated to
its role in the treaty process, unrelated to the subject matter of the
treaty, or unrelated to its legitimate concern for the consequences of its
consent to this treaty. That is not this case. It might be interesting also
to consider whether, as an instance, the Senate in its consent to ratifica-
tion of the Niagara treaty could have imposed the requirement that
development be by a public body only or by a private body only. If we
accept that one whose consent is essential may exact any price for that
consent, it is not utterly certain that the constitutional answer is
96. Continuing: "[Tihat this power entails responsibilities for those who exercise it; that this
power and this responsibility imply and should imply a power, where it is deemed necessary, to
control or postpone the domestic consequences of a treaty at least until Congress can consider
them." Henkin, Niagara Power Reservation, supra note 3, at 1173.
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against the power of the Senate to impose either of these conditions.
But the case of the Niagara reservation is not so difficult [footnote
omitted]. 97
Professor Henkin cited to treaties with Mexico and Austria as to
each of which the Senate incorporated a reservation of purely domestic
concern in its resolution of ratification, and which thereafter was not in-
corporated in the treaty. Concurring that in each case the subject reser-
vation did not become part of the treaty, he said:
What is not considered, however, is whether the reservation was an
effective condition to the consent of the Senate which could not be
disregarded by other branches of the United States Government ....
There is no indication that the Executive Branch or anyone else be-
lieved that the condition could have been disregarded. Especially, no
one suggested that it could be disregarded and yet the Senate be con-
sidered as having consented to the treaty so that the constitutional re-
quirements were satisfied and the treaty became effective [footnote
omitted]. 98
Important to a full appreciation of Professor Henkin's position in the
Power Authority case is that he believed that the particular decision by
the Senate in that case to suspend its own direct treaty power, in favor of
awaiting legislative action by the full Congress, would help to alleviate
political pressures underlying the isolationist Bricker movement by dem-
onstrating that the Senate and President would, in appropriate cases,
limit their own treaty-making authority. He pressed those who chal-
lenged the Senate's power to limit itself to articulate a basis for their
concerns, imploring:
The power exercised in this case by the President and the Senate does
not impinge on powers which might otherwise be exercised by the
states; it does not limit rights which might otherwise be preserved for
the individual citizen; it does not encroach on the legislative power of
Congress-it would seem to enable the legislative power to operate
more effectively. Apart from the accident of one set of circumstances,
whose interests are served by denying this right? In the longer run the
proposition that the treaty power does not include a power of self-
limitation, of inviting the participation of Congress, offers aid and
comfort only to those who seek to impose serious limitations on the
treaty power.99
The Court of Appeals majority in the Power Authority case was not
sympathetic to Professor Henkin's reasoning, holding that the Niagara
Power reservation was of purely municipal concern, was not a part of the
97. Id at 1177.
98. Id. at 1180.
99. Id. at 1182.
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treaty and was thus not the law of the land. 10 The dissenting judge, on
the other hand, reasoned that the reservation was properly the subject of
the treaty and that the Senate had the power to regulate purely domestic
concerns, citing to Professor Henkin's article in conclusion.
Professor Henkin's theory of the Senate reservation power is illumi-
nated somewhat in his 1972 book Foreign Affairs and the Constitution in
which he said:
Legal effect has been given, however, to incidental provisions in a
treaty (or in Senate reservations consenting to it) which themselves
contain no international obligations, for example, a provision that a
treaty shall not be self-executing in the United States; or that territory
acquired under the treaty shall not be automatically 'incorporated' into
the United States but shall await the disposition of Congress. Perhaps
such provisions are considered penumbral to the treaty, sharing in its
character as law of the land; perhaps the Treaty Power implies ancil-
lary authority to regulate the incidental commitments and conse-
quences of a treaty, and such regulations, whether in the treaty or
imposed by the Senate, also have effect as law. Whatever the theory,
surely the Constitution does not prevent the treaty-makers from limit-
ing their own authority and the consequences of their own acts in or-
der to cooperate with Congress and enhance its legislative
opportunities [footnotes omitted]. 101
The Restatement appears to incorporate Professor Henkin's thesis
regarding "non-treaty" reservations, but in doing so recharacterizes the
reservation at issue in the Power Authority case as a Senate "proviso." 10 2
The apparent conflict between the rules of international law governing
the validity of reservations and the Senate's adoption of an illusory reser-
vation is reconciled in the Restatement by changing the Senate's designa-
tion. As a "proviso" the Niagara Power reservation partakes of the
ancillary Senate treaty power proposed by Professor Henkin.10 3 Restate-
ment section 303, Reporters' Note 4, provides:
A condition imposed by the Senate that does not seek to modify the
treaty and is solely of domestic import, is not part of the treaty and
hence does not partake of its character as 'supreme Law of the
Land.'... It was once assumed, therefore, that a Senate proviso that a
100. The Power Authority decision was cited with approval in Holmes, 459 F.2d at 1223 n.95, for
the proposition that a sense of the Senate resolution set forth in a resolution of ratification and
included in the instrument of ratification, but which was "not designed to affect the text or terms of
the treaty or the relations of the parties thereunder,"... "did not condition the ratification."
101. HENKIN, supra note 1, at 160-161. See also id. at 134-136.
102. Of course, if one concludes that the Senate reservation was invalid as a reservation under
international law, one may wish to recharacterize it. It is not so clear that the courts should be free
to undertake such a venture.
103. Professor Henkin similarly refers to the Niagara Power reservation as a "proviso" in the
context of discussing the hypothesis that the Senate's reservation may not have been a valid part of
the treaty in FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 1, at 135.
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treaty shall not take effect for the United States until Congress adopts
implementing legislation could not have the force of law necessary to
prevent the agreement from automatically taking effect as law in the
United States. See Power Authority of New York v. Federal Power
Commission, 247 F.2d 538 (D.C. Cir. 1957), vacated and remanded
with instructions to dismiss as moot, 355 U.S. 64, 78 S.Ct. 141,
2L.Ed.2d 107 (1957). The effectiveness of such a Senate proviso, how-
ever, does not depend on its becoming law of the land as part of the
treaty. Such a proviso is an expression of the Senate's constitutional
authority to grant or withhold consent to a treaty, which includes au-
thority to grant consent subject to a condition. The authority to im-
pose the condition implies that it must be given effect in the
constitutional system. See Henkin, 'The Treaty Makers and the Law
Makers: The Niagara Power Reservation,' 56 Colum. L. Rev. 1151
(1956). 104
In the Restatement, the Niagara Power reservation has assumed the sta-
tus of a proviso, the opinion of the only federal court to have decided the
issue is relegated to the former view, and Professor Henkin's view of the
Senate's power has assumed the status of the prevailing view.
Professor Henkin has expressly dealt with reservations which are of
purely municipal concern to the United States and which he suggests are
of no consequence to the other party to a treaty. He concludes that while
these reservations may not be a part of the treaty, they are valid under
U.S. law because of an ancillary power of the Senate to be found in the
Constitution. We disagree with this conclusion for reasons which we
104. Reporter's note 4 continues:
The Senate has not made a practice of attaching conditions unrelated to the treaty before it.
If the Senate were to do so, or were to attach a condition invading the President's constitu-
tional powers-for example, his power of appointment-the condition would be ineffective.
The President would then have to decide whether he could assume that the Senate would
have given its consent without the condition.
RESTATEMENT, supra note 4, § 314, cmt. e, provides:
The Senate sometimes gives its consent to a treaty on conditions that do not require change
in the substance of the treaty but apply to its implementation in the United States. These
conditions do not require reservations by the United States to the treaty and are only of
domestic significance. See (§] 303, Comment d and Reporters' Note [4].
The text of comment e refers to reporter's note 3, which appears to be a typographical error.
§ 303, cmt. d, states:
The Senate often has given its consent subject to conditions. Sometimes the Senate consents
only on the basis of a particular meaning of the treaty, or on condition that the United
States obtain a modification of its terms or enter a reservation on it. See [§] 314. The Senate
may also give its consent on conditions which do not require change in the treaty but relate
to its domestic application, e.g., that the treaty shall not be self-executing ([§] 114(4)); or
that agreements or appointments made in implementation of the treaty shall require the
Senate's advice and consent.
There is no accepted doctrine indicating limits on the conditions the Senate may im-
pose. Surely, a condition that has no relation to the treaty would be improper, for example,
a requirement that the President dismiss or appoint some cabinet officer. But a condition
having plausible relation to the treaty, or to its adoption or implementation, is presumably
not improper, and if the President proceeds to make the treaty he is bound by the
condition.
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shall state momentarily. We emphasize first, however, that Professor
Henkin has never expressly suggested that a reservation which is not
valid under international law may nevertheless be binding in the United
States because of this ancillary power. Thus, for example, he has not said
that a Senate reservation which would defeat the object and purpose of a
treaty would be valid for domestic purposes. Nor has he addressed the
situation in which another party objects to the U.S. reservation, but not
to the entry into force of the treaty. The Restatement view, though per-
haps confusing, appears to support the conclusion that only a reservation
which is valid and effective under rules of international law is part of a
treaty and thus the law of the United States. It is essential that this con-
clusion be clarified.
A reservation to a multilateral treaty may be invalid or ineffective
under international law for one of several reasons. It may be invalid as
contrary to the object and purpose of the treaty. It may be invalid be-
cause prohibited by the express terms of the treaty. It may be ineffective
with respect to another party to the treaty because objected to by that
party. The question of the international legal effect of the invalidity or
ineffectiveness is complex. In the case in which an objection is interposed
without opposition to the treaty coming into effect, the Vienna Conven-
tion provides that "the provisions to which the reservation relates do not
apply as between two States to the extent of the reservations."10 5 The
Vienna Convention does not expressly address the result following a find-
ing that a reservation is invalid because it is contrary to the object and
purpose of the treaty or its express terms. In some cases the party which
attempts to accede with the invalid reservation will not become a party.
However, in the Belilos case recently decided by the European Court of
Human Rights, the court found the Swiss reservation to be prohibited by
the terms of the treaty and applied the treaty to Switzerland in toto.10 6
Thus, particularly in the context of multilateral human rights treaties,
there is precedent for the proposition that a state's consent to all of the
obligations imposed by a treaty is not defeated by a legally deficient
reservation.
It has been suggested that consideration of the municipal legal effect
of an invalid U.S. reservation is moot because if a U.S. reservation is
invalid under international law, then the treaty to which the U.S. pur-
ports to adhere with the defective reservation does not come into effect
105. Vienna Convention, supra note 7, at art. 21(3).
106. Belilos, 10 Eur. R. Rep. 466.
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with respect to the United States. 0 7 While this is one possibility, it cer-
tainly is not the only one, or necessarily the most likely. Since U.S. courts
interpret and apply treaties in accordance with principles of international
law,108 they may well be called upon to enforce a multilateral treaty with
a reservation originating from the Senate which is deficient as a matter of
international law. It is imperative that these courts not believe them-
selves constrained to apply the deficient reservation because it emanates
from the Senate's treaty power. It is likewise important that these courts
recognize that international law does not require them to invalidate U.S.
adherence to the treaty. The Belilos decision suggests that, in appropriate
circumstances, international law permits application of the treaty in toto
without the legally deficient reservation.
The fact that the Senate's advice and consent is constitutionally re-
quired for adherence to the treaty does not mean that U.S. adherence is
defeated because a Senate reservation is held to be legally deficient. If
U.S. adherence to the treaty is not invalidated as a matter of interna-
tional law, it remains a binding obligation of the United States. A defect
in the internal U.S. approval process will rarely cause it not to be consid-
ered a treaty party. A defective Senate reservation may be viewed as an
internal approval defect which does not defeat U.S. adherence, and the
reservation should not be given a special status as a matter of U.S. mu-
nicipal law.
Professor Henkin's second argument in the Niagara Power case was
that even if the Niagara Power reservation was not a true reservation as a
matter of international law, a Senate reservation with purely domestic
effect in the United States is binding on all constitutional organs as a
consequence of an ancillary treaty power conferred on the Senate by the
Constitution. Addressing this argument requires us, as it did the report-
ers of the Restatement, to shift terminology from the realm of reservation
to other forms of condition. As the Restatement implicitly acknowledges,
a condition such as the Niagara Power reservation is not a reservation in
the accepted international sense of the term, and the U.S. Senate has
adopted other terms, most notably "proviso," to refer to such conditions.
However, as we discuss in the following sections, Senate practice with
respect to the labelling of conditions is not consistent, and provisos in-
tended to have purely domestic effect also have been denominated "un-
derstanding" and "declaration."
107. This suggestion was made by Professor Glennon at a meeting of contributors to the sympo-
sium of which this paper is a part, held in Geneva, Switzerland on November 8 and 9, 1991.
108. See discussion of sources of treaty interpretation in the United States, infra at pp. 604-06,
615-19.
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We do not believe that the Senate possesses an ancillary domestic
legislative power as part of its power of conditional consent. The Consti-
tution specifically allocates the legislative power to Congress in Article I.
Recently, the Supreme Court, in the Chadha 10 9 case, made it plain that
while more creative and efficient legislative mechanisms than those found
in that Article may be readily available, they are not constitutionally
proper. The broadest grant of legislative authority, the "necessary and
proper" clause, is located in Article I. The Article II power of the Senate
is limited to the power to consent to the making of treaties. A treaty is a
specific legal instrument-a "contract among nations" in the words of
the Supreme Court-which pursuant to Article VI of the Constitution is
the law of the United States. In the U.S. Constitutional framework a
treaty is made the equivalent of domestic legislation. The "last-in-time"
doctrine is a judicial expression of this equivalency. The danger to the
constitutional framework represented by the suggestion of an ancillary
legislative power conferred on the Senate is that it may be used by the
Senate to deprive treaties of their self-executing character and thereby
deprive individuals of private rights of action under them. The framers of
the Constitution intended that treaties be given direct effect in U.S. law
when by their terms and context they are self-executing. An ancillary
power of the Senate to deny self-execution directly contradicts this
intent.
In the following sections of this article we will discuss in some detail
the effect which conditions other than reservations have in the U.S. legal
framework. The municipal legal effect of such conditions directly de-
pends on their international legal effect. A reservation which is invalid or
ineffective as a matter of international law is not part of a treaty and is
not the supreme law of the land. The Senate does not have an Article I
constitutional power to make law on its own, and the President and the
Senate acting together do not have an Article II power to make a law
which is not a treaty. Professor Jessup said this plainly forty years ago.110
The position which Professor Henkin first adopted in the context of
the Power Authority case'" reflects a certain set of concerns which per-
109. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919.
110. Professor Jessup represented the Power Authority of New York in the Niagara Power res-
ervation dispute and took a view contrary to that of Professor Henkin. Professor Henkin elaborates
on Professor Jessup's position in Niagara Power Reservation, supra note 3.
111. Professor Glennon adopts essentially the same views as Professor Henkin with respect to
the legal effect of Senate conditions, although his reasoning is somewhat different. Professor Glennon
states that "conditions have the same force domestically and internationally as the text of the
treaty." GLENNON, CONSTITUTIONAL DIPLOMACY supra note 1, 127-28, citing to RESTATEMENT,
supra note 4, § 314, cmt. b. He goes on to say that the Senate's understanding of a treaty-however
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haps were of the utmost importance in the 1950s. In order to dissipate
the strength of the Bricker movement, which sought to emasculate the
treaty power by denying self-execution to all treaties, Professor Henkin
sought to demonstrate that the Senate and President could act with self-
restraint and thereby placate the isolationists. Forty years later the inter-
national community has made tremendous strides toward the protection
of individual rights through treaty. 11 2 Looking at the case law of the Eu-
ropean Court of Human Rights, for example, it is no longer clear that
significant benefits might not accrue even to U.S. citizens from the direct
application of treaties in the area of human rights (with respect, for ex-
ample, to protections against cruel and unusual punishment and discrim-
ination, in the promotion of educational opportunities, and so forth). The
Bricker constituency is decidedly weakened, but is able to impede pro-
gress toward a full participation of the United States in major treaty ad-
vances by the attachment of invidious reservations and other conditions
to multilateral treaties-the Genocide, Torture, and Civil and Political
Rights Conventions being examples. Moreover, as treaties in other areas
of particular concern to individuals, such as those dealing with the pro-
tection of the environment, become increasingly important, small constit-
uencies in the Senate will hold the power to force the attachment of
reservations and other conditions not in the interests of the great major-
ity. It is, in our view, essential that only those conditions recognized as
valid and effective by the international community be given legal effect by
United States courts.
The power of conditional consent, like the treaty power itself, is
labelled and whether express or implied--controls its interpretation for domestic purposes as a mat-
ter of constitutional law, stating, inter alia:
The interest of every state-the United States in particular-in preserving the integrity of
the domestic legal order must prevail against concerns about mere orderliness. The United
States Constitution places limits on the President's power. Whatever international law may
say about the international nature of an obligation undertaken by the United States, those
limits [i.e. the conditions imposed by the Senate] apply domestically and must be respected
unless Congress legislates to change the obligation" [citing to subsequent discussion con-
cerning international law as law of the United States] [emphasis in original]. Id. at 135-36.
Professor Glennon refers to Professor Henkin's testimony at the ABM Treaty hearings in support of
the proposition that the substance of the Senate's understanding of a treaty is constitutionally con-
trolling, regardless of its form (id. at 140). Although Professor Glennon makes the correct general
observation - that only Congressional legislation may domestically supersede an international obli-
gation - he nevertheless assumes that a Senate understanding which may be at variance with an
international obligation created by treaty is domestically binding irrespective of its international
legal effect. Although not expressly stated, the underlying assumption must be that of Professor
Henkin, namely that the Senate has an independent legislative power ancillary to the treaty power.
Professor Glennon's writings have not specifically addressed whether the Senate has an ancillary
power to adopt reservations contrary to international law and to cause them to be given effect in U.S.
courts. His writings clearly support the view that the Senate has an ancillary power to adopt provisos
with purely municipal effect.
112. See Nuclear Test Case, I.C.J. Rep. 253 (1974) (separate opinion of Judge Petren).
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anti-majoritarian because it places in the hands of one-third plus one of
the Senate the power to force the two-thirds majority to agree to condi-
tions to ratification. 1 3 A condition may, and often does, reflect the inter-
ests of a distinct minority of the Senate-but that minority is permitted
to act on behalf of all citizens of the United States in the interests of
achieving the necessary votes for treaty ratification.
It may be readily pointed out that the power of conditional consent
is no more anti-majoritarian than the treaty power itself. This does not,
however, permit the conclusion that it is not independently pernicious.
Multilateral treaties, in particular, are negotiated by a broad community
of states-they reflect the widest interests of the international commu-
nity. They are negotiated prior to their submission to the Senate, though
often with its consultation. A small group of Senators is not often likely
to have a major impact on the text of a multilateral treaty. Even if such a
group may have an impact, it is clearly more likely to have its way in the
narrow confines of the Senate where its power to block ratification is
manifest and where it is in a position to bargain over future Senatorial
interests. Thus the power to adopt a reservation or other condition which
does not need the advance consent of the other parties to a multilateral
treaty is a power far easier to wield than the power to actually modify the
terms of a treaty. It is a far greater power if recognized as an independent
legislative power by the courts-a legislative power unconstrained by in-
ternational law. It is true, of course, that one-third plus one of the Senate
may elect to block that body's consent to the ratification of treaties if
they are denied a virtually unfettered power to control their domestic
effect, a purported power they now attempt to implement by forcing the
Senate to qualify its consent to ratification. We suggest that the increas-
ing interest of individuals in the protection and development of their
rights may give serious pause to those Senators who would refuse to
grant their consent to ratification of treaties but for the attachment of
conditions not valid under international law. That remains to be seen.
Recognizing the importance of the promotion of individual rights, Presi-
dents may alternatively decide to pursue the approval of treaties in the
full Congress, where the majority may ultimately have its say.114
113. While the adoption of a reservation itself requires a majority vote, the power of the minority
to block the ratification process obviously impacts on the achievement of that majority. This was an
important lesson of the failure of the Treaty of Versailles in the Senate.
114. See McDougal & Lans, supra note 1, at 404 et seq.; cited as reflecting the prevailing view,
RESTATEMENT, supra note 4, § 303, reporter's note 8.
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3. Understandings in International Law"15
The term "understanding" refers to various forms of interpretative
statements or declarations attached to instruments of ratification, adher-
ence or accession which are not intended to modify the legal obligations
of a party."16 As previously noted in U.S. practice an "understanding"
generally refers to a statement by which the government expresses its
interpretation of a particular treaty provision and a "declaration" gener-
ally refers to a statement by which the government states its position
with respect to the applicability or nonapplicability of the rules of a sepa-
rate treaty or international law to the treaty in question. In international
practice, understandings are often referred to as "interpretative state-
ments" or "interpretative declarations." There is, however, a lack of uni-
formity with respect to the usage of the terms "understanding,"
"declaration," "proclamation" and similar terms both internationally
and in the municipal U.S. context.
Although the Vienna Convention does not expressly address the
legal significance of understandings, two provisions certainly illuminate
their potential effect. First, a reservation is a unilateral statement in any
form purporting to modify a treaty obligation. If an understanding is
something other than a reservation, it should not purport to modify a
party's treaty obligations. Second, Article 31 of the Vienna Convention,
which establishes general rules for interpretation of treaties, provides
that treaty terms shall be given their ordinary meaning "in their context"
and thereafter provides that the context shall include "any instrument
which was made by one or more of the parties in connection with the
conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other party as an instrument
related to the treaty." An understanding which is communicated to an-
other treaty party as, for example, in an instrument of ratification, will
115. See generally HoRN, supra note 72.
116. This perhaps simplifies the definitional issue, but is in accord with commentaries to the
International Law Commission's draft articles as adopted at its 14th session and included in its
report to the U.N. General Assembly for what was ultimately the Vienna Convention, which when
trying to distinguish reservations and interpretative declarations short of reservations said:
The need for this definition arises from the fact that States, when signing, ratifying, acced-
ing to, accepting or approving a treaty, not infrequently make declarations as to their un-
derstanding of some matter or as to their interpretation of a particular provision. Such a
declaration may be a mere clarification of the State's position or it may amount to a reser-
vation, according as it does or does not vary or exclude the application of the terms of the
treaty as adopted.
1962 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 163. Commentaries to the final draft articles of the Vienna Convention
referred to "declarations as to their understanding of some matter or as to the interpretation of a
particular provision" and said that if such a declaration is not "a mere clarification of the State's
position," but varies or excludes the application of the terms of the treaty as adopted, it constitutes a
reservation. Official Records, U.N. Conf. on Law of Treaties, 1971 Docs. of the Conf. 10.
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therefore form part of the treaty "context" and should be considered as
evidence at least of one party's intention. 1" 7
There is not firm agreement among scholars as to whether the rules
of the Vienna Convention applicable to reservations apply with similar
effect to understandings."1s The view more widely held by scholars ap-
pears to be that the same rules do not apply.1 9 This is particularly im-
portant with respect to the question whether the rule that failure to
object to a reservation within twelve months following notification con-
stitutes acquiescence is in like manner applicable with respect to under-
standings. 20 The prevailing view is that failure to object to an
understanding does not constitute acquiescence.' 2 1
4. Understandings in the Municipal Law of the United States
Consideration of the legal effect of understandings in the municipal
law of the United States must take into account a number of distinct uses
of the term or concept. As described in the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee report, supra, an "understanding" refers to an interpretative
statement regarding the text of the treaty, and a "declaration" regards
incidental matters intended to be incorporated in an instrument of ratifi-
cation. These two types of conditions would comport with what we be-
lieve to be the generally accepted international meaning of the terms
"interpretative statement" or "interpretative declaration." Because these
types of understanding are intended for communication to the other
treaty party or parties, we will sometimes refer to this type as an "express
understanding." The "understanding" of the Senate may also refer to
what the Senate may have understood a treaty to mean at the time it gave
its consent to ratification based on information and analysis received
from the Executive branch (and perhaps also from its own sources of
information and analysis)-in current Foreign Relations Committee par-
lance the "shared understanding" of the Senate and Executive branch. 122
This understanding may be reflected in a committee report or published
117. This view was expressed by the special rapporteur, Waldcock, responding to comments
concerning the International Law Commission's 1962 draft of the Vienna Convention. 1965 Y.B.
INT'L L. COMM'N 46-49.
118. Horn, who has extensively surveyed the literature, says: "Although there are some writers
who do adhere to the view that interpretative declarations are governed by the same rules as reserva-
tions, the majority of writers stress the importance of making a distinction between these two catego-
ries of statements [footnote omitted]." HoRN, supra note 72, at 244.
119. Id
120. Id at 238-44.
121. Id.
122. See Remarks of Senator Biden at Hearings on the Convention Forces in Europe Treaty,
supra note 62, at 47-48. See discussion infra text accompanying notes 150-83.
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preratification debate or in the comments of a Senator made during a
committee hearing. 123 Although this understanding may be in writing,
because it is not communicated to the other treaty party or parties, we
will sometimes refer to this type of understanding as an "implied under-
standing." The Supreme Court in United States v. Stuart, 24 discussed
infra, has at least left open the troubling suggestion that an implied Sen-
ate understanding may have an international legal effect. Finally, the
Senate also incorporates "provisos" in its resolutions of ratification
which are not intended for incorporation in the instrument of ratification
and which appear most often intended to offer instruction to the Execu-
tive branch. As purely internal directives we are not aware of any sugges-
tion that such "provisos" may impact the international legal effect of
treaties,125 but we will consider the potential for municipal legal effect.
a. Express Understandings
Express understandings are by definition intended to affect the inter-
pretation of treaties by executives and judicial bodies on the international
and therefore on the domestic level. Also, by definition, express under-
standings are not intended to modify the terms of treaties, only to clarify
the interpretation of one or more parties. As mentioned above, under the
Vienna Convention rules on treaty interpretation, an understanding in-
corporated in an instrument of ratification is part of the "context" of the
treaty's terms and will be used to assist in ascertaining the meaning of the
terms. Thus a party's express unilateral statement as to its understanding
of the terms of a treaty is given weight at least as evidence of that party's
intent as to meaning under international law. United States courts are
said to approach the interpretation of treaties in a somewhat different
manner than international adjudicatory bodies or the courts of some
other states, but this difference is perhaps rather subtle. United States
courts generally view treaties as international contracts, which view is
consistent with that set forth in the Vienna Convention. United States
courts have traditionally attempted to ascertain the intent of the parties
to a treaty in order to interpret it, and so often rely on extrinsic evidence
123. This is not intended as an exhaustive list of potential sources of Senate understanding be-
cause the concept is not well defined. It might be argued to include a Senator's post-ratification
testimony as to his or her subjective but unexpressed belief when voting on the resolution of
ratification.
124. 489 U.S. 353 (1989).
125. Depending on one's view of the extent of the Senate's proviso power, it might be argued
that the President's failure to comply with the terms of a proviso constitutes a manifest violation of
the internal treaty approval process and therefore will permit the United States to escape its treaty
obligations under Article 46 of the Vienna Convention.
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to supplement express language, perhaps to a greater extent than some
other adjudicatory bodies. This difference in approach, in the words of
the Restatement Reporters, "should not be exaggerated."12 6 A few recent
statements by the Supreme Court of the rules of treaty interpretation are
illustrative of that Court's approach.
In Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United States Dist.
Court for the S. Dist. of Iowa 127 the Court said:
In interpreting an international treaty, we are mindful that it is 'in the
nature of a contract between nations' . . . to which 'general rules of
construction apply.' ... We therefore begin 'with the text of the treaty
and the context in which the written words are used.'... The treaty's
history, 'the negotiations, and the practical construction adopted by
the parties' may also be relevant [citations omitted].1 28
In Volkswagenwerk A.G. v. Schlunk,129 the Court said: "Treaties are con-
strued more liberally than private agreements, and to ascertain their
meaning we may look beyond the written words to the history of the
treaty, the negotiations, and the practical construction adopted by the
parties."
In Air France v. Saks,130 the Court said: "This interpretation... is
consistent with the negotiating history of the Convention, the conduct of
the parties to the Convention, and the weight of precedent in foreign and
American courts. In interpreting a treaty it is proper, of course, to refer
to the records of its drafting and negotiation."1 31
In Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc. v. Avagliano,132 the Court said:
Interpretation of the Friendship, Commerce and Navigation Treaty
between Japan and the United States must, of course, begin with the
language of the Treaty itself. The clear import of treaty language con-
trols unless application of the words of the treaty according to their
obvious meaning effects a result inconsistent with the intent or expec-
tation of its signatories [citations omitted] (id. at 180).
In Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd,133 the Supreme Court had occasion to
interpret the Warsaw Convention, the sole authentic text of which is in
French. The opinion for a unanimous Court, written by Justice Marshall,
reiterated the general rules of treaty construction often stated by the
126. RESTATEMENT, supra note 4, § 325, reporter's note 4.
127. 482 U.S. 522 (1987).
128. Id at 532.
129. 486 U.S. 694 (1988).
130. 470 U.S. 392 (1985).
131. The Court may, however, have given a clue to its subsequent thinking in Stuart when it
added: "In part because the 'travaux preparatories' of the Warsaw Convention are published and
generally available to litigants, courts frequently refer to these materials to resolve ambiguities in the
text." 470 U.S. at 400.
132. 457 U.S. 176 (1982).
133. 111 S.Ct. 1489 (1991).
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Court. The Court stressed on several occasions, moreover, that the criti-
cal task in deciding on a proper interpretation of the Convention was to
establish "the shared expectations of the parties to the Convention."'' 34
The Court considered it appropriate only to rely on French court deci-
sions prior to the conclusion of the Convention (which might have illu-
minated the then-contemporary meaning of the French text) because
court decisions rendered later "do not necessarily reflect the contracting
parties' understanding of the [subject] term."' 35 The Court was per-
suaded that the parties to the Convention did not consider a specific form
of recovery to be included within the language subject to interpretation
because, at the time the Convention was concluded, that form of remedy
was unavailable in many jurisdictions.1 36 Thus, in the Court's view, it
was unlikely that the subject remedy was within the parties' shared ex-
pectations. Had it been, the Court expected that the parties would have
made an unequivocal reference to demonstrate their specific intent.1 37
Whatever subtle difference there may be between Supreme Court
practice and that of other states or international adjudicatory bodies, 1 38 it
is nonetheless plain that the Court considers the text of a treaty as the
starting point for interpretation, that contextual factors (including prac-
tice of the parties) are significant and that the negotiating history of the
treaty may be used to illuminate its meaning. Context undoubtedly in-
cludes the express understandings of the parties under international law
and, although not the subject of any decided case, should be part of the
interpretive context according to established Supreme Court doctrine as
well.
Section 314, comment d, of the Restatement may be somewhat too
categorical in its assertion that: "A treaty that is ratified or acceded to by
the United States with a statement of understanding becomes effective in
domestic law (sec. 111) subject to that understanding." 139
We note that the legal effect of understandings in international
treaty law is not entirely settled, including the issue whether failure to file
an objection constitutes acquiescence. 40 Because an understanding may
134. Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 111 S.Ct. 1489, 1494 (1991).
135. Id. at 1495.
136. Id. at 1498.
137. Id.
138. To place this subtle difference in the context of the Vienna Convention, we might say that
the Convention suggests recourse to negotiating history only when context (matters included in
related agreements and instruments, etc.) leaves an ambiguity. The Supreme Court may allow in
negotiating history to establish the meaning of terms as an element of context.
139. Section 111 restates, inter alia, the proposition that international treaties are part of the law
of the land.
140. See discussion supra text accompanying notes 116-21. The RESTATEMENT provides:
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not in all circumstances settle the meaning of a treaty term under inter-
national law (in the clearest case in the situation in which another party
files an objection to it), we do not believe that any party's unilateral un-
derstanding is determinative until it is examined in its context. In the
bilateral treaty setting an understanding incorporated by one party in an
instrument of ratification may be considered binding if the assent of the
other party may be inferred from its acceptance of the instrument. 41 In
the multilateral setting a number of factors may need to be considered,
including whether objections have been filed and whether state practice
with respect to understandings requires an objection to be filed to conclu-
sively evidence disagreement.1 42
If a foreign state files an objection to a U.S. understanding it is un-
likely that the U.S. understanding would be considered determinative by
an international adjudicator and a U.S. court should consider the effect
of the absence of mutual assent as well. We agree with the Restatement
to the extent that a court in the United States must consider an express
understanding by the Senate (concurred in by the President by inclusion
in the instrument of ratification) in the context of interpreting a treaty.
Moreover, as a statement of the combined views of the political branches
of the United States government, we believe that under established
Supreme Court doctrine such views are to be accorded "great weight."
The Supreme Court has consistently held that the views of the Executive
branch with respect to the interpretation of a treaty are entitled to "great
weight" 143 and the concurrent views of both the Senate and Executive
In relation to a multilateral agreement, a declaration of understanding may have complex
consequences. If it is acceptable to all contracting parties, they need only acquiesce. If,
however, some contracting parties share or accept the understanding but others do not,
there may be a dispute as to what the agreement means, and whether the declaration is in
effect a reservation. In the absence of an authoritative means for resolving that dispute, the
declaration, even if treated as a reservation, might create an agreement at least between the
declaring state and those who agree with that understanding. See Subsection (2Xc). How-
ever, some contracting parties may treat it as a reservation and object to it as such, and
there will remain a dispute between the two groups as to what the agreement means.
Id. § 313, cmt. g.
141. This conclusion appears logically to follow from the generally accepted analogy between
bilateral treaties and contracts. However, there may be contexts even in the bilateral setting in which
an understanding included in an instrument of ratification would not be considered binding as when,
for example, the representative of the party to which the understanding is tendered indicates an
absence of concurrence yet nevertheless states a readiness to allow the treaty to enter into force. See
discussion infra text accompanying note 235.
142. See discussion supra text accompanying notes 118-21. The Vienna Convention specifically
provides that a reservation which does not defeat the object and purpose of a treaty or is not pre-
cluded by its terms is deemed accepted unless objected to within one year of its notification. Vienna
Convention, supra note 7, art. 20(5). The Convention is silent on other forms of condition. Whether
silence constitutes assent to an interpretive statement is unsettled.
143. See Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187 (1961); Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 294-
95 (1933).
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should perhaps carry even greater weight. However, we suggest that
United States courts must determine for themselves whether a particular
express understanding in fact controls the meaning of a treaty by examin-
ing that understanding in its context. If an understanding has been ob-
jected to, is inconsistent with the object and purpose of a treaty, or is
manifestly contrary to the terms of the treaty, then these and other con-
textual factors must be considered. The combined view of the political
branches may be close to determinative, but since this view is not part of
the express terms of the treaty and is not independent domestic legisla-
tion with the force of law, it remains for the courts under Article III of
the Constitution to determine the meaning of the treaty in accordance
with applicable rules of construction.
Of particular concern to us are recent efforts of the Senate to declare
the non-self-executing nature of various treaties. 1" The United States
upon its ratification, accession to, or adherence to a treaty has a customa-
rily recognized right to state its understanding or interpretation of the
treaty. Thus, the Senate has the power, in conjunction with the Presi-
dent, to incorporate in an instrument relating to the treaty a statement
regarding the U.S. understanding as to whether the treaty or a particular
provision thereof is self-executing. A declaration or interpretive state-
ment is not a reservation. It does not purport to exclude or modify treaty
terms. Under the more widely held view, an interpretive declaration does
not become binding upon parties to a treaty which fail to object to it. An
understanding, interpretative statement, or declaration is a unilateral
matter.
Whether or not a treaty is self-executing is not a unilateral question.
Whether a treaty requires municipal implementing legislation and is in-
tended to confer rights directly on individuals is a question of the mutual
intent of the parties to the treaty, to be determined by the language of the
treaty and other indicia of intent. This principle was recognized and
adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court in the earliest days of U.S constitu-
tional history. Justice Marshall's opinions in Foster v. Neilson 145 and
United States v. Percheman 46 articulated a doctrine of self-executing
treaties which made plain that the paramount consideration for the
Court in deciding whether a provision in the Treaty of 1819 with Spain
144. See discussion of Torture Convention infra text accompanying notes 218-32. See also the
contribution by Professor Damrosch to this symposium. Lori Fisler Damrosch, The Role of the
United States Senate Concerning "Self-Executing" and "Non-Self-Executing" Treaties, 67 CH.-
KENT L. REv. 515 (1991).
145. 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829).
146. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51 (1833).
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confirming existing land grants was self-executing was the mutual intent
of the governments of Spain and the United States in making the treaty,
to be determined by examining its express language. In Percheman, Jus-
tice Marshall held the subject provision of the treaty to be self-executing
despite a series of congressional acts subsequent to the treaty that were
directed at the confirmation of land title claims.1 47 Had the Court consid-
ered Senate or Congressional intent with respect to the treaty paramount,
it may well have concluded that the treaty was non-self-executing. More-
over, in Ware v. Hylton,14 the Supreme Court previously had rejected
the argument that because Great Britain required municipal legislation
to implement a treaty, the treaty as a matter of mutuality of obligation
must be non-self-executing as to the United States. The principle that
questions of self-execution are to be determined by examining the mutual
intent of the parties to a treaty is thus firmly imbedded in the U.S. consti-
tutional framework.
It may well be that U.S. courts in the process of interpreting treaties
should give great weight to Executive/Senate statements of intent in the
their making. However, to borrow an expression from the Court of
Claims, great weight does not demand blind obedience.149 The courts
must interpret and apply treaties in accordance with applicable rules of
international law, and these rules must be used to determine whether a
treaty is self-executing.1 50
b. Implied Understandings
As noted previously, a controversy has arisen in the United States
concerning the effect which the Senate's internal understanding of a
treaty as developed during the advice and consent process, and as re-
flected in sources such as Foreign Relations Committee Reports, pub-
lished preratification debates and comments made by Executive branch
representatives and Senators during hearings, may have on the interpre-
tive process. Several questions are raised with respect to the Executive
and the Judicial branches and the international community. Does the so-
called "shared understanding" of the Senate and the Executive bind the
147. Id See also supra note 28.
148. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796).
149. See Coplin v. United States, 6 Ct. Cl. at 136, where the Court of Claims uses somewhat
different language with respect to the weight of Executive branch views in treaty interpretation.
150. This is not to suggest that the Senate and President may never attach a reservation to an
otherwise self-executing treaty provision so as to make it non-self-executing. A reservation concern-
ing non-self-execution must, of course, be valid in accordance with the international law rules gov-
erning reservations. Unlike a declaration, understanding or interpretative statement, a reservation
purports to modify or exclude the terms of a treaty.
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Executive in the interpretation of a treaty? Does this shared understand-
ing bind the courts? Does this shared understanding have any implica-
tions for other treaty parties?
The Senate does not have the power to bind the President to a par-
ticular treaty interpretation except through the mechanism of attaching a
reservation, which becomes an integral part of the treaty instrument, or
an express understanding which becomes part of the formal interpreta-
tive context as an instrument relating to the treaty. 51 In default of these
mechanisms, to the extent that the President changes his or her interpre-
tative view in good faith following ratification, we believe that any com-
plaint by the Senate is of a purely political nature and not legally
enforceable. The executive power, which includes the power to interpret
in the process of application, is in the first instance expressly delegated to
the President by Article II, section 1, clause 1 of the Constitution. The
final power of interpretation is vested in the Supreme Court by Article
III. The Senate does not possess an executive interpretative power of its
own and so cannot force the President to interpret a treaty in a particular
way other than through a reservation or express understanding. We note
that Congress ultimately has the power to repeal the domestic effect of a
treaty by subsequent legislation and so to mitigate the damage a Presi-
dent may do through exercise of the power to interpret a treaty.
An implied or shared understanding is not binding on the courts. It
is neither part of a treaty instrument nor legislation. 15 2 The views of the
Senate may be consulted as an aid to treaty interpretation to determine
the intent of the United States. However, an implied Senate understand-
ing does not have as great a weight as evidence of the understanding of
the treaty negotiators as reflected in the treaty negotiating history, nor
does it have as great a weight as the performance of the treaty parties.
Beyond the plain terms of a treaty, the essential inquiry for the courts is
what the parties to the treaty intended it to mean. By analogy to basic
contract law, this meaning is best ascertained by the outward manifesta-
151. An express understanding will bind the President domestically to the same extent it will
bind the President internationally. The extent to which an express understanding binds the party
making it as a matter of international law is not entirely clear. It has been suggested that the estoppel
doctrine may play a role, at least if parties on notice of the understanding appear to have accepted it.
See HoRN, supra note 72, at 236-44. The Senate does not have the power to bind the President to a
particular treaty interpretation through the attachment of an express understanding beyond the lim-
its of the binding character of the understanding under international law.
An implied or shared understanding between the President and the Senate as to the meaning of
a treaty may have a legal effect as between the two political branches to the extent that the President
and his representatives may be subject to charges of perjury or similar misconduct in the event they
deliberately mislead the Senate as to the meaning of a treaty during the advice and consent process.
152. Note that the understanding of Executive branch treaty negotiators is not binding on the
courts either, but may be given great weight.
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tions of assent by the parties and by their performance. The Vienna Con-
vention recognizes this priority by assigning the greatest weight to
instruments connected with the treaty and performance. The unex-
pressed understanding of either party is of lesser weight because it is not
a part of the basis of the bargain.
At most, the Senate's implied understanding of a treaty may affect
its internationally accepted meaning if the other party or parties have
actual notice of the Senate's understanding, an opportunity to object, and
if it would have been reasonably convenient and appropriate for such an
objection to be made. In most instances, particularly in the multilateral
treaty context, these criteria will not be met. The suggestion that parties
to treaties with the United States should be held responsible for the Sen-
ate's implied understandings must be considered in the light of imposing
a reciprocal duty on the United States. The impracticability and harmful
effects of an international legal rule which would hold the United States
responsible for knowledge of the treaty approval processes of its treaty
partners is readily apparent.
The problem of implied Senate understandings came to the fore in
the relatively recent ABM Treaty reinterpretation dispute.1 53 President
Nixon had entered into a treaty with the Soviet Union which limited the
rights of the parties to undertake both the construction of anti-ballistic
missile systems and research and testing of new missile defense systems.
More than a decade later, at the time he wished to obtain congressional
funding for futuristic "Star Wars" research, President Reagan advised
the Congress that he interpreted the ABM Treaty to prohibit the deploy-
ment of futuristic missile defense systems, but to permit their research
and testing. A number of Senators objected, claiming that when Presi-
dent Nixon's representatives presented and explained the prospective
ABM Treaty to them for their advice and consent, these representatives
had advised the Senate that the treaty would prohibit the researching and
testing of futuristic systems.
President Reagan and his advisors claimed first that the classified
negotiating history of the treaty supported their interpretation. Second,
they claimed that the Executive possessed an inherent authority to inter-
pret a treaty in the course of its performance, even if an Executive inter-
pretation differed from one proffered to the Senate during the advice and
consent process, unless the Executive's initially proferred interpretation
153. See The ABM Treaty & the Constitution, Joint Hearings before the Committees on Foreign
Relations and Judiciary, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 100-10 (1987) [hereinafter Hearings]; Symposium,
Arms Control Treaty Reinterpretation, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 1353-557 (1989).
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met certain conditions regarding Executive intent in providing the inter-
pretation and Senate reliance on that interpretation. Members of the Sen-
ate argued that the President was bound to stand by his own legislative
record because the Senate acted in reliance on that record. The Senate
Foreign Relations Committee eventually held several days of hearings on
the reinterpretation issue. 154 This particular controversy did not, how-
ever, reach the courts. In the final analysis, the President's continued
Star Wars funding was restricted on the basis of an interpretation of the
ABM Treaty satisfactory to Congress.155
Illustrating the Senate's concern on this subject, when it subse-
quently consented to ratification of the INF Treaty in 1988, the following
"condition" was included in its resolution:
(1) Provided, that the Senate's advice and consent to ratification
of the INF Treaty is subject to the condition, based on the treaty
Clauses of the Constitution, that - (A) the United States shall inter-
pret the Treaty in accordance with the common understanding of the
Treaty shared by the President and the Senate at the time the Senate
gave its advice and consent to ratification .... 156
More recently, on July 11, 1991, at the opening of Foreign Relations
Committee hearings on the proposed Conventional Forces in Europe
Treaty, Senators Biden and Helms pressed Secretary of State Baker for a
commitment that the Senate would be entitled to regard Executive
branch testimony as authoritatively interpreting the treaty and would be
entitled to rely on that interpretation vis-d-vis the Executive branch. 57
Secretary Baker responded that Executive branch testimony can and
should be treated as authoritative. He deferred answering the second
question for consultation with his lawyers, and subsequently responded
for the record that the "administration will in no way depart from the
interpretations of the CFE Treaty that we are presenting to the Sen-
ate." 158 The Senate's subsequent resolution of ratification with respect to
the CFE Treaty included a declaration affirming that the "constitution-
ally-based principles of treaty interpretation" contained in the so-called
154. Hearings, supra note 153.
155. National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal years 1988 and 1989, Pub. L. No. 100-80,
§ 225, 101 (Stat. 1019), 1056 (1987); H.R. Rep. No. 44, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 594 (1987).
156. 134 CONG. REc. S6,937 (daily ed. May 26, 1988), reprinted in 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 10-15
(1988). President Reagan ratified the INF Treaty and thereafter sent a letter to the Senate claiming
that the President is not bound by such a resolution 24 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. (June 13, 1988).
157. Senator Biden threatened that if such commitments were not forthcoming, the Committee
would be forced to undertake a line by line review of the treaty and add its own express conditions.
Hearings on CFE Treaty, supra note 62, at 47-48.
158. Testimony of Secretary of State James Baker, id. at 47-49.
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"Biden condition" to the INF Treaty are applicable to all treaties.159
In the aftermath of the ABM treaty reinterpretation dispute the
Supreme Court did, however, have occasion to opine on the role of Sen-
ate preratification history in the treaty interpretation process in United
States v. Stuart.w6o In Stuart, Canadian citizens were under investigation
by their tax authority which sought information with respect to certain
bank accounts held by them in the United States. Pursuant to a tax treaty
between Canada and the United States, the Canadian revenue authorities
sought assistance from the U.S. Internal Revenue Service which issued a
summons for the bank records. The Canadian citizens sought to quash
the summons on the grounds that U.S. law precludes the issuance of a
summons by the IRS when a Justice Department referral for possible
criminal prosecution is in effect, and because Canadian authorities were
involved in a criminal investigation. The IRS claimed that observance of
the U.S. rule on the IRS issuance of a summons was not required under
the terms of the treaty with Canada and that Senate preratification his-
tory of the treaty did not support such a requirement.16' In holding for
the United States, the Court interpreted the treaty not to require the ap-
plication of U.S. procedural restrictions, partially in reliance on Senate
preratification floor debate (which did not in fact illuminate the issue). In
so holding, the Court not only said that reliance on Senate preratification
history as an aid to interpretation was appropriate, but went on to add
the remarkable proposition that the public record of Senate treaty con-
sideration would be a better indicator of a treaty's meaning than its nego-
tiating history because the negotiating history is rarely a matter of public
record when it is considered by the Senate.
Three Justices felt strongly enough about the Court's statement on
the role of Senate preratification debates to file separate concurring opin-
ions on the issue. Justice Kennedy, writing for himself and Justice
O'Connor, emphasized that the Court had no reason to reach the issue
since it held that the meaning of the treaty was manifest from the lan-
guage of the document. Justice Scalia, in a strongly worded concurring
opinion, was sharply critical of the Court's dictum that Senate preratifi-
cation debate is a better interpretative source than the treaty negotiating
159. 137 CONG. REC. S17,845-46 (daily ed. Nov. 23, 1991); 137 CONG. REc. S18,038 (daily ed.
Nov. 25, 1991).
160. 489 U.S. 353 (1989).
161. It is not quite clear from the majority and concurring opinions whether the Solicitor Gen-
eral referred to the preratification history as an affirmative argument in favor of the United States, or
referred to it merely to rebut the defendant's assertion that the legislative history supported it. See
id. at 367 n.7.
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history, 162 stating it "is rather like determining the meaning of a bilateral
contract between two corporations on the basis of what the Board of
Directors of one of them thought it meant when authorizing the Chief
Executive Officer to conclude it."' 163 Justice Scalia noted that "it can
hardly escape the Court's attention that the role of Senate understanding
in the treaty ratification process has recently been the subject of dispute
between the Senate and the Executive" and referred to several newspaper
articles concerning the ABM Treaty dispute.164
Justice Scalia's concurring opinion itself provoked a response in the
American Journal of International Law from Professor Detlev Vagts, 165
who had collaborated in the preparation of a portion of the Restatement
of which Justice Scalia had been critical in his opinion. Justice Scalia had
referred to two provisions in the Restatement. One states that indication
that the Senate ascribed a particular meaning to a treaty is relevant to
interpretation by the courts in much the same way that legislative history
is relevant to statutory interpretation.1 66 The other states that U.S. courts
are required 167 to take into account United States materials relating to
the formation of an international agreement, which may include domes-
tic legislative materials such as committee reports and debates in deter-
mining the meaning of a treaty.168 Justice Scalia opined that these
provisions must be regarded as proposals for change rather than restate-
ment of existing doctrine and that the commentators had not referred to
a single United States court case that employed the referenced prac-
tice. 169 Professor Vagts pointed out that the Supreme Court itself had on
a number of occasions consulted legislative materials as an aid to treaty
interpretation, in fact quite recently. Professor Vagts did not, however,
162. The Court said:
A treaty's negotiating history, which Justice Scalia suggests would be a better interpretive
guide than preratification materials ... would in fact be a worse indicator of a treaty's
meaning, for that history is rarely a matter of public record available to the Senate when it
decides to grant or withhold its consent.
Id. at 368 n.7.
163. 489 U.S. at 374 (Scalia, J., concurring).
164. Id. at 376.
165. Detlev F. Vagts, Senate Research Materials and Treaty Interpretation: Some Research
Hints for the Supreme Court, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 546 (1989).
166. RESTATEMENT, supra note 4, § 314, cmt. d.
167. It is interesting to note that Justice Scalia's opinion indicates that the RESTATEMENT would
"permit" the courts to refer to the legislative record, 489 U.S. at 375, while at least at § 325 re-
porter's note 5, the courts are said to be "required" to take into account such materials. Presumably
had he focused on the mandatory aspect of the Restatement view, Justice Scalia would have been
even more concerned. We do not suggest that reference to legislative materials is impermissible.
168. RESTATEMENT, supra note 4, § 325, reporter's note 5.
169. 489 U.S. at 375-76.
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address the majority opinion proposition that legislative materials are
"better" evidence than negotiating history, nor does the Restatement.
The Supreme Court's dictum in Stuart is troubling for two reasons.
The first is its focus on the Senate's approval process as the primary point
where a treaty's meaning might become fixed. Whether or not the testi-
mony is public, when an Executive branch representative testifies before
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee this testimony is not subject to
questioning or rebuttal by representatives of the foreign government or
governments which are also participating in the negotiations. It is the
testimony of the federal government to the federal government and not
necessarily the testimony of the individual closest to the actual negotia-
tions. Even if in the bilateral treaty context the other treaty party might
be expected to be aware of such testimony - and this is not always real-
istic - it is quite unreasonable to assume that parties to a multilateral
treaty will pay attention to Senate testimony. It is illogical to conclude
that such testimony or committee reports could be the best supplemen-
tary evidence of a treaty's meaning. More important, perhaps, is the ex-
tent to which the Supreme Court appears to have disregarded its own
well settled jurisprudence on treaty interpretation in its Stuart dictum.
We previously set forth several of the Supreme Court's statements of
its rules for treaty interpretation, all of which are compatible with the
rules laid out in the Vienna Convention.1 70 In virtually all of the cases we
cited, the Court in fact referred to a part of the Senate legislative record
in the course of interpreting the treaty, but in the context of citing to the
testimony of an Executive branch official concerning its negotiating his-
tory or legal issues relating to it. In no case we are aware of does the
Court use reference to legislative history to defeat the plain meaning of a
treaty or a meaning it otherwise might have established by reference to
negotiating history or practice. Sumitomo Shoji is the lead case cited in
Stuart for principles of interpretation. In that case, after it considers the
express language of the treaty, the Court refers to the interpretations
which the foreign ministries of both parties placed on that language, say-
ing that such interpretations must be given great weight and that "we
must, absent extraordinarily strong contrary evidence, defer to that inter-
170. See supra text accompanying notes 127-37. The Vienna Convention prescribes rules for the
interpretation of treaties at articles 31-33. It provides that the terms of a treaty will be given their
ordinary meaning in their context and in light of the object and purpose of the treaty. The context
includes related agreements and instruments made and accepted in connection with it. Subsequent
agreements, practice and relevant international law rules are also taken into account. Special mean-
ings will be given to terms when it is established that the parties so intended. When application of the
forgoing rules leaves an ambiguity, recourse may be had to the preparatory work of the treaty and
the circumstances of its conclusion.
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pretation,"' 71 footnoting to this comment: "We express no view, of
course, as to the interpretation of other Friendship, Commerce and Navi-
gation Treaties which, although similarly worded, may have different ne-
gotiating histories" [emphasis added]. 172 Repeating what the Court said
in Schlunk :173 "Treaties are construed more liberally than private agree-
ments, and to ascertain their meaning we may look beyond the written
words to the history of the treaty, the negotiations, and the practical
construction adopted by the parties. ' 174 After so stating, the Court then
proceeded to an extensive review of the treaty negotiating history. 175
In Trans World Airlines v. Franklin Mint Corp.,176 the Court said:
We may not ignore the actual, reasonably harmonious practice
adopted by the United States and other signatories in the first 40 years
of the Convention's existene ... in determining whether the Executive
Branch's domestic implementation of the Convention is consistent
with the Convention's terms, our task is to construe a 'contract' among
nations. The conduct of the contracting parties in implementing that
contract in the first 50 years of its operation cannot be ignored [cita-
tions omitted]. 177
In Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd,78 the Court repeatedly empha-
sized that its critical interpretative task was to establish the shared expec-
tations of the parties to the Warsaw Convention, not the expectations of
any single party to it.
In Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Stevic, 79 the Court re-
ferred to a mutual understanding of the President and the Senate that the
U.N. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees "was largely consistent
with existing law" when accession was approved by the Senate. The
Court referred both to remarks in Committee and on the Senate floor. '810
Those references have little, however, to do with interpreting the Proto-
col itself, the language of which the Court readily decided did not require
a specific result in the case. The question before the Court in Stevic was
171. Sumitomo Shoji of America, Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 185 (1982). See supra text
accompanying note 132.
172. Id. at 185 n.12. The Court also cited to an article written by a State Department official who
was responsible for drafting the form of the treaty at issue to shed light on its purpose. Id. at 181 n.6.
173. 486 U.S. 694 (1988).
174. Id. at 700.
175. The majority opinion cites to a Foreign Relations Committee Report for testimony by an
Executive branch member of the negotiating delegation on a point relating to clarifying the timing of
a form of notification, which is in addition to a cite on the same point in the official negotiating
record. Id. at 703.
176. 466 U.S. 243 (1984).
177. Id. at 259-60.
178. 111 S.Ct. 1489 (1991), supra note 134.
179. 467 U.S. 407 (1984).
180. Id. at 417-18.
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whether Congress intended to incorporate a particular standard based on
the Protocol when it subsequently amended the domestic statute con-
cerning the status of refugees, which the Court held it did not. The refer-
ence to the Senate understanding in this case therefore relates primarily
to the intention of Congress in enacting subsequent legislation, and only
peripherally to the interpretation of a treaty.
The forgoing references to the case law of the Court are intended to
demonstrate that the dictum of the Court in Stuart is probably not a
reliable indication of the Supreme Court's own rules on treaty interpreta-
tion. The Court has manifestly followed a practice which is consistent
with the Vienna Convention and customary international law by inter-
preting treaties in accord with the intent of the parties, and not with the
understanding of one House of the U.S. Congress.
We believe that it is important to avoid the adoption of rules on
treaty interpretation in the United States which are inconsistent with the
rules of the Vienna Convention or customary international law. The in-
tegrity of the international treaty process and of the international legal
system is dependent on the use of reasonably consistent rules of interpre-
tation by judicial bodies, whether international or municipal. While rec-
ognizing the profound desirability of adherence to the Vienna
Convention principles, 181 Professor Henkin yet contends that U.S. prac-
tice with respect to express and implied Senate understandings may,
pending ratification of the Convention, properly lead the municipal
courts to interpret treaties in a manner inconsistent with Vienna Conven-
tion principles. In Senate testimony regarding interpretation of the ABM
Treaty, Professor Henkin discussed his perspective on the role of express
and implied Senate understandings in a way which makes clear his view
as to the potential bifurcation of domestic and international legal effects
of such understandings:
All are agreed that if the Senate makes its understanding [of the
meaning of a treaty] explicit, that understanding is binding. But an
understanding that is not made explicit may nevertheless be clear and
is equally binding.
181. He states in the ABM Treaty hearings:
I think Senator Helms might be understood as casting aspersions on the Vienna Con-
vention on the Law of Treaties because the Senate has not yet given consent to its
ratification.
I wanted to say, for the record, that the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties is
not controversial, certainly not controversial on the subject we are addressing today; that
its content is accepted as customary law; that the restatement has built its entire treatment
of the law of treaties on that convention. Therefore, I do not want anybody leaving these
hearings to think there is something wrong with the Vienna Convention.
Hearings, supra note 153, at 100.
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The second point is that the interpretation of any treaty, unlike an
interpretation of the Constitution and unlike interpretation of a stat-
ute, is an international question .... In some circumstances what a
treaty would be held to mean internationally is not necessarily the
same as what the Senate consented to. That may be. Therefore, talk
about a 'meeting of the minds' of the parties is beside the point. The
point is that, whatever an international body might make of it, for con-
stitutional purposes, the Senate's clear understanding as to what a
treaty means in an essential respect is constitutionally binding on all
constitutional organs. 18 2
With all due respect, we must strongly disagree that the Senate has
the constitutional power attributed to it by Professor Henkin. There is no
basis in the Constitution whatsoever for concluding that the Senate has
the power to control the interpretation of a treaty such that a court must
reach a result which is inconsistent with that which would be reached
through the sound application of rules of construction acceptable under
international law - rules which, the Stuart dictum aside, the Supreme
Court has consistently adhered to. The Senate does not have an "ancil-
lary" treaty power which permits it to compel such a result.
It seems apparent that a general acceptance by the international
community of the proposition of the Supreme Court majority in the Stu-
art case - that domestic legislative debates are better evidence of the
meaning of a treaty than its negotiating record - is ill-suited to promot-
ing stability in the international legal system. Under the theory espoused
in dictum by the majority, each state party to a treaty would be entitled
to interpret treaty provisions in accord with its domestic priorities, in
disregard of the common understanding of the treaty negotiators. The
Restatement does not encourage this result and should not be cited in
182. Hearings, supra note 153, at 90. This testimony is reflected in the RESTATEMENT at various
places. Section 325, cmt. a, states:
Customary international law has not developed rules and modes of interpretation having
the definiteness and precision to which this section aspires. Therefore, unless the Vienna
Convention comes into force for the United States, this section does not strictly govern
interpretation by the United States or by courts in the United States.
RESTATEMENT, supra note 4, § 325 cmt. a. Comment g to section 325 notes that the interpretative
rules provided for in that section are somewhat different than those applied by United States courts
and states that:
In most cases, the United States approach would lead to the same result, but an interna-
tional court using the approach called for by this section might find the United States
interpretation erroneous and United States action pursuant to that interpretation a viola-
tion of the agreement.
RESTATEMENT, supra note 4, § 325 cmt. g. Reporter's note 4 to section 325 states:
The international law on the interpretation of international agreements is binding on the
United States, and is part of the law of the United States. Insofar as this section reflects
customary law, or if the United States adheres to the Vienna Convention, courts in the
United States are required to apply those rules of interpretation even if the United States
jurisprudence of interpretation might have led to a different result.
RESTATEMENT, supra note 4, § 325, reporter's note 4.
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support of this proposition. At most, the Restatement merely records
what is perhaps an unfortunate present fact that would be largely allevi-
ated by U.S. adherence to the Vienna Convention. The Restatement's
suggestion that U.S. practice "requires" reference to legislative materials
in fact may be somewhat misleading, particularly when now read in con-
junction with the Stuart dictum. While Supreme Court practice has
countenanced such reference, it has not used such reference to trump
treaty negotiating history. 183
c. Provisos
A third type of Senate condition or understanding is, especially re-
cently, referred to as a "proviso" which, according to the Congressional
Research Service Study, "includes those [conditions] which are not in-
tended to be included in the formal instruments of ratification because
they do not involve the other parties to the treaty but instead relate to
issues of U.S. law or procedure."' 8 4 However, this terminology is not
consistently applied. Although provisos may typically involve directions
of different kinds aimed at the Executive branch, the Senate has, for ex-
183. Another recent Supreme Court decision of some interest with respect to sources of interpre-
tation is O'Connor v. United States, 479 U.S. 27 (1986). This case was taken by the Supreme Court
to resolve a conflict between the Federal Circuit Courts on the interpretation of an Executive Agree-
ment implementing the Panama Canal Treaty. At issue was whether the agreement relieved U.S.
citizen employees of the Panama Canal Commission from the payment of U.S. income taxes (in
addition to relieving them from the payment of Panamanian taxes).
The U.S. Court of Claims (a federal court of the first instance), among other courts, had ruled
in favor of the taxpayers on the plain meaning of the agreement, further holding that attempts by the
Executive branch to establish the meaning after the fact by its own version of the negotiating history
were not persuasive. The Court of Claims had urged the Executive to seek a clarification from Pan-
ama as to its interpretation during the proceedings, but this request had been rejected by the Justice
Department. During the course of the appeal to the Federal Circuit Court, the State Department in
fact obtained a note from the Government of Panama concurring in the U.S. interpretation that the
exemption from taxes did not concern U.S. income taxes. The Federal Circuit relied on this note, in
conjunction with the Executive branch interpretation, as conclusive evidence of the meaning of the
provision in question.
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit had meanwhile decided in favor of the taxpayers,
again on the clear language of the treaty, and again unpersuaded by Executive branch after the fact
attempts to establish a meaningful negotiating history. The Court of Claims and the Eleventh Circuit
both diminished the significance of preratification testimony by an Executive branch representative
before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (which supported the government's position) as hav-
ing little weight.
In the final analysis, Justice Scalia writing for a unanimous Supreme Court held that the plain
language of the treaty clearly favored the government and so ruled against the taxpayers. In the view
of the Supreme Court, the language of the treaty was so plain that supplementary interpretative
sources did not need to be consulted, and so declined to rule on the import of the note from the
Panamanian Government, the Senate testimony or various other Executive branch interpretive
sources. It is a mystery that a provision which was sufficiently ambiguous to be given a contrary
meaning by the Court of Claims and the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals could have been under-
stood to have so plain a meaning by a unanimous Supreme Court.
184. Cong. Res. Study, supra note 1, at 110.
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ample, recently adopted, with respect to the Torture Convention, a con-
dition labelled a "proviso" which is a hybrid condition involving
elements of reservation affecting other treaty parties, intended for com-
munication to them but not intended for inclusion in an instrument of
ratification. 8 5 The Senate has also, for example with respect to the
NATO Status of Forces Agreement, added understandings aimed
squarely at U.S. administrative procedures not affecting the other parties
to a treaty, yet caused the inclusion of such conditions in an instrument
of ratification. '8 6
Because it is accepted that the Senate may condition its approval of
the ratification of a treaty with conditions that purport to modify or in-
terpret it, that is, reservations or express understandings, specific instruc-
tions to the President as to the intended placement of such conditions
with respect to the treaty instruments (should the President choose to
accept them and proceed with ratification) are appropriate. 8 7 On the
other hand, the Senate does not have the power to modify the constitu-
tional allocation of power between itself and the President by purporting
to effect such modification in a resolution of ratification. 188 It perhaps
need not be pointed out that the object of the Bricker movement was to
effect such a modification. Therefore, a statement to the effect that the
President must interpret a treaty in accordance with a particular consti-
tutional mechanism (as is the purported effect of the condition to ratifica-
tion of the INF and CFE Treaties, discussed supra), or that the courts
must do so, is manifestly ineffective.18 9 Although the proper allocation of
the power to terminate treaties is in dispute,190 the Senate does not have
the power to resolve the issue through the adoption of a proviso - even
if such a proviso is accepted by the President. The President and the
Senate acting together may not alter the constitutional framework 91
185. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 219-25, discussion of proviso included in resolution
with respect to approval of Torture Convention.
186. See Holmes v. Laird, 459 F.2d 1211, 1224 (D.C. Cir. 1972), at which the court identifies
issue of legal effect but does not address because not raised by appellant.
187. This proposition itself was the subject of recent controversy in respect to the President's
decision regarding a military basing agreement with Spain to attach certain Senate declarations in an
appendix to the treaty rather than in the instrument of ratification itself as intended by the Senate.
See GLENNON, supra note 1, at 124-25.
188. The constitutional allocation of powers, of course, may be modified only by an amendment
to the Constitution.
189. Professor Henkin agrees that the Senate cannot bind the President to a constitutional prin-
ciple. Henkin, Treaties in a Constitutional Democracy, supra note 3, at 417.
190. See Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 997 (1979), and discussion supra note 58.
191. Cf. I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 952-59 (1983). See supra text accompanying notes 34-
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(though the President and Senate may reach political accommodations
which may be nearly as effective).
Similarly, the Senate may not enact internal legislation through the
mechanism of the proviso. Domestic legislation is a matter for the Con-
gress as a whole (acting with the President or over a veto) pursuant to the
unambiguous terms of Article I of the Constitution.192 It should be noted
that the Senate might subject the President's ratification of a treaty to a
stated condition precedent, as, for example, the enactment of legislation.
In no case, however, a treaty qua treaty may have domestic effect prior to
being internationally operative.
A "proviso" to the Torture Convention resolution of ratification
provides that the President will communicate certain conditions of the
United States with respect to the internal effect of the treaty prior to
ratification (which conditions are not to be included in the U.S. instru-
ment of ratification). The conditions to be communicated are the same as
those which were included as a reservation to the Genocide Conven-
tion.193 Although this condition is labelled a "proviso," it obviously has a
significant bearing on other parties to the treaty because it says, in es-
sence, that the United States considers its internal law superior to the
treaty and will not apply the treaty in the event of a conflict. Since the
treaty deals, inter alia, with the rights of individuals in the United States,
the proviso must be construed to affect the rights of other treaty parties.
This proviso is particularly troubling both as a matter of interna-
tional law and domestic United States law. On the international plane,
what is to be made of a condition that is clearly communicated but not
included in a treaty instrument? A reservation is a statement in any form
purporting to modify a legal obligation made at the time of signing, rati-
fying, or acceding to a treaty. Is the statement communicated in accord-
ance with the proviso in fact a reservation? Must other states object to
preserve their rights? On the municipal front, are courts to construe the
proviso as a true reservation? If yes, is it a reservation invalid as a matter
of substantive international law that they must not apply?194 Should the
President consent to communicating a condition so likely to generate
confusion within the international and domestic legal communities on a
matter of such great import?
192. Id. at 951.
193. See discussions of Genocide and Torture Convention conditions, infra text accompanying
notes 195-232.
194. See discussion infra text accompanying notes 220-25.
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5. Reservations and Understandings to the Genocide Convention
While the United States was an original signatory to the Convention
on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide' 95 in 1948, the United
States did not ratify the treaty until 1988. The reasons for the delay are
complex and touch upon a variety of domestic and international is-
sues. 196 The following observations may be made with some confidence:
(1) the causes for the delay principally involved Senate rather than Exec-
utive branch concerns; (2) in the face of Senate resistance, no President
was willing to make ratification of the Genocide Convention a political
priority; and (3) early efforts at ratification roughly coincided with efforts
by a substantial number of Senators to enhance the role of the Senate in
the treaty-making process and to correspondingly diminish the role of
the Executive (that is, the Bricker proposals) making the President's po-
sition particularly difficult. 97
Aside from these points, long-running Senate opposition to ratifica-
tion of the Genocide Convention appeared to hinge on three points.
First, the Genocide Convention might interfere with the protections af-
forded to American citizens by the U.S. Constitution.1 98 Second, the Ge-
nocide Convention (and other such conventions) would weaken the
position of the states vis-d-vis the federal government on questions of in-
dividual rights.1 99 Third, the United States takes its international legal
obligations more seriously than other states and might be put into a posi-
tion wherein it would be held (and agree to be held) legally accountable
for its actions when other states would not be so held.2°° It was fre-
quently stated in the Senate that ratification by the United States of the
195. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 78 U.N.T.S. 277
(entered into force January 12, 1951) [hereinafter Genocide Convention].
196. See generally C. H. McLaughlin, The Scope of the Treaty Power in the United States II, 43
MINN. L. REV. 651, 667-68; Weissbrodt, supra note 3, at 38 n.45.
197. It has been argued that antagonism toward human rights treaties was the primary motiva-
tion behind the Bricker movement. See Natalie H. Kaufman & David Whiteman, Opposition to
Human Rights Treaties in the United States Senate: The Legacy of the Bricker Amendment, 10 HUM.
RTs. Q. 309 (1988). President Eisenhower, through Secretary of State Dulles, made a commitment
not to pursue the ratification of the Genocide Convention in order to defuse the Bricker movement.
Weissbrodt, supra note 3, at 38 n.45.
198. See, e.g., Genocide Convention: Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Comm. On Foreign
Relations, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1970) (Statement of Senator Ervin); The Genocide Convention. Hear-
ing Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 8 (1981) (Statement of
Senator Thurmond).
199. See Weissbrodt, supra note 3; Kaufman & Whiteman, supra note 197, at 323-24.
200. The Bricker constituency argued that ratification of human rights covenants by Soviet bloc
states did not appear to improve their human rights records, but that ratification by the United
States would open it up to politically motivated charges of non-compliance. In addition, a recurring
theme of opposition to the Genocide Convention involved a somewhat amorphous threat of an in-
creasing role for international organizations in the domestic political arena. See Kaufman & White-
man, supra note 197, at 324-27.
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Genocide Convention would constitute a goodwill gesture designed to
show support for an international cause because United States citizens
are protected by the U.S. Constitution and, in any event, the crime of
genocide would be unthinkable in the United States.20 1
a Reservations to the Genocide Convention
In tribute to the retirement of Senator William Proxmire, who, for a
period of twenty years, made a speech in favor of ratification on the floor
of the Senate every legislative day, the Senate in 1988 passed a resolution
of ratification with respect to the Genocide Convention. This resolution
of ratification incorporated two reservations, five understandings, and a
declaration. 202 The first reservation purports to exclude the United States
from the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice
(provided for in article IX of the Convention). The second reservation
provides: "That nothing in the Convention requires or authorizes legisla-
tion or other action by the United States of America prohibited by the
Constitution of the United States as interpreted by the United States."
The reservation excluding the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ for
disputes concerning the interpretation or application of the treaty with
respect to the United States reflects a persistent distrust of binding inter-
national dispute settlement procedures in the Senate as described by
Judge Lauterpacht in his Interhandel dissent. This distrust is not
uniquely American and it may of course be pointed out that until the
unfortunate Nicaragua incident the United States had accepted the com-
pulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ (even if arguably defectively). The Geno-
cide Convention is silent as to reservations. A number of states have
entered reservations with respect to article IX thereby purporting to ex-
clude compulsory jurisdiction and a number of states have likewise ob-
jected to these reservations. Since the Convention does not expressly
preclude reservations (or reservations to article IX) some of the objec-
tions may be based on the belief that compulsory jurisdiction is essential
to the object and purpose of the treaty.203 The question of the compatibil-
ity of the compulsory jurisdiction reservation with the object and pur-
201. See, eg., Genocide Convention: Senate Hearings on the Genocide Convention before the Sen-
ate Subcomm. on the International Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide of the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950) (statement of Dean
Rusk, Dep. Undersec'y, State Dept.); Genocide Implementation Act, Hearings before the Subcomm.
on Immigration, Refugees, and International Law of the House Judiciary Comm., 100th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1988) (statement of Richard Schifler, Asst. Sec'y, Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs,
Dept. of State).
202. 132 CONG. REc. S1,377-78 (daily ed. Feb. 19, 1986).
203. For an express statement of the basis of the objection as going to the object and purpose of
the treaty, see objection of the Netherlands, United Nations Secretariat infra at note 208.
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pose of the Convention is one as to which we do not express an
opinion.20 4 We point out, however, that determination of the object and
purpose of the Convention is a problem of international law and not a
problem of the municipal law of any party to the Convention.
The second reservation of the United States is far more problematic
both as a matter of international law and as a matter of the municipal
law of the United States.
(i) International Aspects
As a matter of international law, the United States has purported to
reserve to itself the discretion to determine whether and when its obliga-
tions under the Genocide Convention are inconsistent with and are
thereby superseded by its municipal Constitution. In the absence of an
express reservation, the international law rule is as stated in article 27 of
the Vienna Convention: "A party may not invoke the provisions of its
internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty."
By its express reservation, the United States purports to exclude the
operation of the rule of customary international law codified in the Vi-
enna Convention that a state may not interpose its internal law in order
to defeat a treaty obligation. Few reservations could more clearly strike
to the object and purpose of a Convention intended to, inter alia, protect
the residents of state parties from crimes committed by their own govern-
ment than a reservation which sets up the internal constitutional law of a
state party as a barrier to their protection. If the Genocide Convention
had been in force at the time, the Nazi exterminations in Europe would
presumably have escaped its application had the National Socialist gov-
ernment decided to enact constitutional changes declaring certain racial,
religious, and ethnic classes unprotected as a matter of constitutional
law. 205 While such a hypothetical represents the extreme case for the
abuse of such a reservation, it is certainly possible to postulate less dra-
matic inroads by municipal governments into the protections afforded by
the Convention. The apparent effect of universal application of the U.S.
204. Eight of the seventeen members of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations adopted
"Additional Views" with respect to the proposed reservations and understandings which are not a
part of the main report. These Senators objected to the inclusion of the reservation to Article IX on
the grounds that to do so would preclude the United States from using the Convention "as a valuable
weapon for the advancement of human rights around the world." Genocide Convention, Report of the
Committee on Foreign Relations, together with Additional and Supplemental Views, 99th Cong., 1st
Sess. 29-30 (1985) [hereinafter Additional Senate Views].
205. Of course this is not intended to suggest that genocide would not remain a crime under
customary international law.
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reservation would be to make each state party to the treaty indepen-
dently responsible for determining the level of protection afforded by it.
Equally disconcerting is the notion that the United States purports
to have sole discretion to determine the applicability of its Constitution,
thereby appointing itself a judge in its own case. It is unnecessary to
repeat here the points made by Judge Lauterpacht in his dissenting opin-
ion in the Interhandel case, 2°6 except to note that permitting a state to
determine the applicability of its own constitution to defeat the effect of a
treaty would be far more problematic than permitting it the right to de-
termine what is an internal matter (as considered in Interhandel) because
there is little that is transparent to outside observers in the matter of
constitutional interpretation.20 7
We believe that the second U.S. reservation to the Genocide Con-
vention is incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty as a
matter of international law. The effect of its invalidity either may be that
the United States is not to be considered a party to the Convention, or
that the treaty remains in force with respect to the United States but
without giving effect to the reservation. 20 8
206. Interhandel Case (Switzerland v. United States), supra note 74, at 95 (Dissenting Opinion
of Sir Hirsch Lauterpacht).
207. The Additional Senate Views, supra note 204, at 30-31, reflect an appreciation of and objec-
tion to the problems raised by the constitutional supremacy reservation.
208. According to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Report on the Torture Convention,
twelve Western European nations have filed objections with respect to the constitutional supremacy
reservation to the Genocide Convention S. REP. No. 101-30, 101st Cong., 2d. Sess. (1990). The
most recently published U.N. Multilateral Treaty Index shows nine European states having entered
objections with respect to the U.S. reservations to the Genocide Convention (Denmark, Finland,
Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom). Greece has ob-
jected to all reservations, present and future (not specific to the United States) United Nations Secre-
tariat, Multilateral Treaties Deposited with Secretary-General (Status as at 31 Dec. 1989). These
objections take different forms. Several states object to the reservation purporting to exclude the
compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ. The Netherlands, in particular, concludes that on the basis of the
article IX reservation it does not consider the United States a party to the Convention. All nine
objecting states refer to the reservation purporting to assert the supremacy of the U.S. Constitution
over the Convention. Spain simply proffered its own interpretation of the U.S. reservation with
which it would apparently be satisfied. Others expressed the view either that the U.S. reservation
creates uncertainty as to the extent of U.S. obligations under the Convention (Italy, the Netherlands
and the United Kingdom) or that the reservation is inconsistent with the rule of international law
that a state may not invoke its internal law as justification for failure to perform a treaty (Denmark,
Finland, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden). Only Sweden expressly stated that it does
not consider the U.S. reservation as an obstacle to the treaty coming into force between the two
countries. No state expressly stated that the second reservation defeats the entry into force of the
treaty as between itself and the United States.
The Vienna Convention does not directly address the situation resulting when a party makes a
general reservation (i.e., one which does not address itself to a particular treaty article) and other
parties object to that reservation. Presumably, the offending reservation is ineffective as between the
reserving and objecting parties, but the state entering the reservation may not have been willing to
accept its treaty obligations without the general reservation intact. A reserving state in this position
may be forced to withdraw its consent to be bound or otherwise be presumed to accept its treaty
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(ii) Municipal Aspects
The municipal status of the Genocide Convention under United
States law is also problematic. If the treaty is in force under international
law, but without the invalid reservation, then the treaty is in force as the
law of the land in the United States, likewise without the invalid reserva-
tion. This follows from the principles of U.S. constitutional law which we
previously stated: namely, that the treaty is the law of the land and that
the Senate does not have an independent legislative power to enact a
binding reservation which is not a part of the treaty instrument. On the
other hand, if the treaty is not in force for the United States as a matter
of international law, then it similarly is not in force as the municipal law
of the United States because a treaty to which the United States is not a
party is not the law of the land. There is no constitutional basis on which
a court could conclude that a treaty which is not in force for the United
States as a matter of international law possesses an independent validity
under domestic law.2° 9 However, because Congress as a whole adopted
the Genocide Convention Implementation Act of 1988 (the Proxmire
Act) prior to ratification of the treaty, which Act establishes the federal
crime of genocide, the substance of the Convention is largely in force in
the municipal law of the United States regardless of the status of the
treaty.210
b. Understandings to the Genocide Convention
(i) International Aspects
The U.S. understandings to the Genocide Convention touch upon
the unresolved issue whether interpretative statements are subject to the
same Vienna Convention rules as reservations, particularly whether si-
lence on the part of the other parties to the treaty constitutes assent to
the stated interpretations. 2"1 As stated previously, the more widely ac-
cepted view is that the Vienna Convention rules do not apply directly
and silence should not be taken as acquiescence. 212 If the understandings
obligations without their purported limitation. Recall that in the Belilos case, 10 Eur. R. Rep. 466,
supra note 75, the European Court of Human Rights excluded the prohibited general reservation
and applied the treaty to Switzerland in toto.
209. This does not include the situation in which a domestic court might find that the rules
embodied in a treaty had an independent basis as customary international law.
210. Pub. L. No. 100-606, 102 Stat. 3045 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1091-93 (1988)). The enact-
ment of this implementing legislation was the subject of a Senate declaration with respect to ap-
proval of ratification, requiring the President to refrain from depositing the instrument of ratification
prior to the enactment of "the implementing legislation referred to in Article V" of the Convention.
211. See discussion supra text accompanying notes 118-21.
212. See HoRN, supra note 72.
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are not binding internationally, then they express the views of the U.S.
government with respect to the manner it interprets the treaty and go to
assist in establishing the context for interpretation of the treaty as a mat-
ter of international law.21 3 The declaration of the Senate that the Presi-
dent shall not ratify the treaty until municipal implementing legislation is
enacted is in the nature of a "proviso" as it is not intended to affect other
parties to the treaty.214
(ii) Municipal Aspects
Based on the principles of constitutional law we previously dis-
cussed, municipal courts in the United States are not bound to interpret
the Genocide Convention in the manner stated in the Senate understand-
ings except as such understandings validly form part of the context of the
treaty. The Senate understandings constitute part of the context of the
treaty for purposes of interpretation in United States courts as they
would for purposes of interpretation in an international judicial forum.
However, it must be pointed out that Congress enacted legislation imple-
menting the Genocide Convention prior to its ratification by the United
States. This legislation, which was adopted by the Congress pursuant to
Article I of the Constitution,21 5 controls interpretation of the treaty in
United States courts irrespective of its international interpretation.21 6
213. Recall that understandings are not intended to effect the obligations of the parties pursuant
to the treaty. The U.S. might be estopped from denying the validity of an interpretation by another
party made in reliance on the express U.S. understandings.
214. There was one possible international effect. Had the Congress failed to enact legislation and
had the President nevertheless proceeded to ratify, it might have been argued that the President's
action was manifestly contrary to U.S. constitutional requirements and thus that U.S. adherence was
defective.
215. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, inter alia, authorizes Congress to define and punish "Offences
against the Law of Nations."
216. Since the legislation was enacted prior in time to the ratification of the treaty, the question
might be raised whether subsequent ratification of a self-executing treaty supersedes any inconsisten-
cies in the legislation pursuant to the "last-in-time" doctrine. Although such a suggestion is plausi-
ble, because the intent of the legislature in such case would almost certainly be that the legislation be
deemed to control the treaty for domestic purposes, application of the "last-in-time" doctrine in such
case would unproductively elevate form over substance (and simply cause Congress in the future to
expressly provide that the legislation takes effect immediately upon ratification). In any event, U.S.
courts will use their best efforts to reconcile the terms of a federal statute and a treaty; see, eg., Cook
v. United States, 288 U.S. 102 (1933); whatever the sequence of their effectiveness. Note that the
Senate's resolution of ratification with respect to the International Convention for the Unification of
Certain Rules relating to Bills of Lading, signed at Brussels, Aug. 25, 1924, included an understand-
ing providing that in the event of a conflict between that convention and the previously enacted
Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, the "provisions of said Act shall prevail," 51 U.S. Stat. 233, TS No.
931, 2 Bevans 430. There is some judicial support for the proposition that those parts of a treaty
which require criminal penalties must be implemented by legislation and therefore may not be self-
executing as a matter of constitutional principle. See The Bello Corrunes 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 152
(1821); Dainese v. Hale, 91 U.S. 13 (1875). See also Riesenfeld, The Power of Congress and the
President in International Relations, supra note 1, at 651 n.30.
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The Senate declaration to the Genocide Convention regarding the
requirement for pre-ratification implementing legislation is, under the
terminology of the Congressional Research Study, a "proviso" because it
was not intended to affect the other treaty parties and was not included
in an instrument of ratification. 21 7 Because this proviso related solely to
the time at which the President would be authorized to deposit the in-
strument of ratification, this would appear to be a valid exercise of the
Senate power of consent: it is not in the nature of purported modification
of the treaty instrument, it does not purport to bind the President or the
courts to any interpretation of the treaty or manner of its execution, and
it does not purport to effect a change in the constitutional allocation of
powers.
3. The Torture Convention (Reservations, Understandings,
Declarations, and a Proviso)
To some extent the lessons of the Genocide Convention were re-
flected in the Senate in contemplation of the Convention against Torture
and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.218
Although the Senate resolution of ratification contains two reservations,
five understandings, and two declarations,21 9 a condition identical to the
second reservation to the Genocide Convention (asserting the supremacy
of the U.S. Constitution) was relegated to a "proviso." The proviso stipu-
lated that the President would not deposit the instrument of ratification
of the United States, "until such time as he has notified all present and
prospective ratifying parties to this Convention that nothing in this Con-
vention requires or authorizes legislation, or other action, by the United
States of America prohibited by the Constitution of the United States as
interpreted by the United States. '220 The resolution of ratification stated
that the proviso was not to be included in the U.S. instrument of
ratification. 221
217. We have not been able to find a documentary source indicating the Senate's intent as to
whether the proviso was to be included in the instrument of ratification.
218. Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punish-
ment, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1984, 23 I.L.M. 1027, 24 I.L.M. 535 [herinafter Torture Conven-
tion] (adopted by U.N. General Assembly as G.A. Res. 39/46, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp. No.
51, at 197 (entered into force June 26, 1987)).
219. For preratification debate and text of resolution of ratification, see 136 CONG. REC.
S17,486, 491-92 (daily ed., Oct. 2, 1990).
220. Id. at S17,492.
221. The proviso to the Torture Convention, as earlier discussed, is a hybrid condition in that it
is not intended to be included in an instrument of ratification, but directly affects the interests of
other parties to the treaty. The Senate would appear to have the power to require the President to
communicate the text of the proviso as a condition precedent to ratification because the Senate is
issuing instructions with respect to the placement of the condition-that is, outside the instrument of
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The texts of the preratification debate and the Senate Foreign Rela-
tions Committee Report recommending consent to ratification make
plain that the ill effects of the second reservation to the Genocide Con-
vention were known by the Senate prior to ratification of the Torture
Convention. 222 The President agreed to the terms of the proviso only in
response to pressure from a conservative Senator, Jesse Helms. Senator
Helms argued on the floor of the Senate that the hierarchical status of
treaties and the Constitution is uncertain, that he would be "derelict in
[his] duties as a U.S. Senator sworn to uphold the Constitution were I to
disregard the potential conflict between what the Constitution actually
says and those who say what the Constitution says" and that, if the Con-
stitution is in fact superior to treaty law, then his proviso (which he
would prefer as a reservation) is superfluous at worst.223 Senator Moyni-
han, on the other hand, pointed to the damage already done by the sec-
ond reservation to the Genocide Convention and noted its growing
appeal to states seeking to avoid international obligations. Senator Moy-
nihan said:
I remain concerned that this statement [the proviso] will create a polit-
ical and diplomatic problem for the United States and provide a rhe-
torical device which nations using torture can employ to defend their
actions. This will not, as I have stated, be a sound legal defense to their
conduct. Nonetheless, it will inevitably and unfortunately be used. 224
While the Vienna Convention stipulates that a treaty must be in
written form, it makes no such requirement of a reservation. A reserva-
tion is a "unilateral statement, however phrased or named" which must
be made "when signing, ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to a
treaty. ' 225 It is not entirely clear that a statement conveyed by the Presi-
dent prior to ratification may not purport to modify a legal obligation.
Senator Moynihan's concerns about the adverse use of Senator Helm's
proviso therefore may not be so ill-founded.
Notwithstanding the apparent step forward represented by relega-
tion of the general constitutional supremacy clause to a "proviso," the
first U.S. reservation to the Torture Convention includes reference to the
supremacy of certain specific provisions of the U.S. Constitution which
ratification. This does not, however, influence the substantive validity of the condition under domes-
tic or international law.
222. See CONG. REC., supra note 219; CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE AND OTHER CRUEL,
INHUMAN OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT, S. EXEC. Doc. No. 30, 101st Cong., 2d
Sess. (1990).
223. 126 CONG. REc. at S17,486-87.
224. Id. at S17,490. See also letter from eight Senators opposing proviso printed in record of
preratification debate. Id
225. Vienna Convention, supra note 7, Article 2(d).
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are nearly as troublesome as the more general reservation.226 Absent an
in-depth study of American constitutional jurisprudence (and even after
such a study), another state party to the Torture Convention would find
determining the scope of the United States' obligations under the treaty
quite a difficult task. To the extent that states filed objections to the sec-
ond Genocide Convention reservation on the ground that the scope of
the U.S. obligation was indeterminate, there is only marginal cause for
these states to refrain from objecting to the first Torture Convention res-
ervation. To the extent that states objected that the U.S. had reserved the
right to interpose its internal law to defeat the application of the treaty in
derogation of well-known principals of international law, the objections
remain applicable.227 The fact that the United States has not expressly
reserved for itself the discretion to determine the meaning of its Constitu-
tion in this particular reservation is of course a step forward.228
Our analysis of the international and municipal legal effects of the
Genocide Convention reservation with respect to constitutional
supremacy applies here mutatis mutandis. Reservations which purport to
assert the supremacy of internal U.S. law are inconsistent with the object
and purpose of the treaty and should be invalid as a matter of both inter-
national and municipal law. The status of the treaty with respect to the
United States is uncertain. We note, however, that because of the more
frequent practice of torture (as compared to genocide) issues concerning
application of the Torture Convention are far more likely to find them-
selves before the municipal courts of the United States.
The second U.S. reservation to the Torture Convention excludes the
compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ for the settlement of disputes. This
reservation is expressly permitted under the terms of the treaty 229 and is
therefore valid as a matter of international and municipal law.
226. The first U.S. reservation provides that the terms "cruel, inhuman, degrading treatment or
punishment" as used in the Convention are limited to the reach of those terms under the prohibi-
tions of the fifth, eighth, and/or fourteenth amendments to the U.S. Constitution. It is important to
note that not all of the referenced terms are actually used in the Constitution (i.e., "inhuman,"
"degrading," and "treatment" are not used) and that the limits of even the express terms (i.e.,
"cruel" and "punishment") are judicially constructed.
227. The Torture Convention reservation with respect to limiting the definition of cruel, inhu-
man or degrading treatment appears to reflect in large measure Reagan Administration concerns
that the European Commission on Human Rights had interpreted those terms to encompass treat-
ment which would not be prohibited under the U.S. Constitution. See CONVENTION AGAINST TOR-
TURE AND OTHER CRUEL, INHUMAN OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT, supra note
222, at 8; Convention Against Torture: Hearings before the Senate Conm on Foreign Relations, 101st
Cong., 2d Sess., at 5 (1990) (statement of Hon. Abraham D. Sofaer, Legal Adviser, Dept. of State).
228. Note, however, that the right of the United States to make a unilateral determination is
included in the message to be conveyed by the President pursuant to the proviso.
229. See Torture Convention, supra note 218, at art. 30(1) and 30(2).
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The U.S. understandings to the Torture Convention reflect a caution
which is difficult to reconcile with America's self-perception as a leading
proponent of human rights. We will not dissect each of the interpretative
constraints, but merely note that most are designed to raise the threshold
of malicious behavior necessary to constitute a violation of the terms of
the treaty. The fundamental question is whether the Senate's understand-
ings are binding on the courts of the United States. As noted with respect
to the Genocide Convention understandings, it is the more widely held
view that as a matter of international law silence by other state parties
with respect to interpretative statements does not constitute agreement to
them. The understandings should therefore constitute part of the inter-
pretative context of the treaty both from an international and municipal
legal standpoint.
The Senate has purported to address the question of the self-execut-
ing nature of the Torture Convention in the first of two "declarations"
included in the resolution of ratification which appear intended for inclu-
sion in the instrument of ratification. The declaration provides: "That the
United States declares that the provisions of Articles 1 through 16 of the
Convention are not self-executing. '230 Because Articles 1 thorough 16
create specific rights in favor of individuals, and because the Torture
Convention does not otherwise suggest the necessity for the enactment of
subsequent legislation to bring its protections into force,231 it is likely
that the Convention will be deemed self-executing, at least in part, by an
international judicial body or municipal court in the United States. If the
condition is considered an interpretative statement and is incompatible
with the internationally accepted meaning of the treaty, the declaration
should be disregarded by municipal courts in the United States. Because
the Senate declaration purports to modify the otherwise self-executing
character of at least part of the treaty, it might also be construed as a
reservation to U.S. adherence. Because the condition is self-styled by the
Senate as a declaration, it is not at all clear that other state parties to the
treaty would be required to file objections to it in order to preserve a
right to object at a later time. They may nevertheless do so. There is also
the question whether the condition, if properly characterized as a reser-
230. Supra note 219.
231. Note that Article 2 of the Convention provides that "Each State Party shall take effective
legislative, administrative, judicial or other measures to prevent acts of torture in any territory under
its jurisdiction," Article 4 provides that states will ensure that all acts of torture constitute criminal
offenses under their law, and Article 19 provides for the submission of reports to the Committee
established in Part II on the measures states have taken to give effect to their undertakings under the
Convention. None of these provisions suggest that the enactment of implementing legislation is a
condition precedent to the assertion of the rights of individuals.
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vation, may defeat the object and purpose of the treaty. In interpreting
the Torture Convention, U.S. courts must examine for themselves the
extent to which the treaty is intended to be self-executing as a matter of
international law, whether the Senate declaration is compatible with this
intent, whether other state parties to the treaty object to the declaration,
and the extent to which the declaration may defeat the object and pur-
pose of the treaty.232
F. The Separate Case of Bilateral Treaties
1. International Law with Respect to Reservations and
Understandings to Bilateral Treaties
Although the Vienna Convention does not expressly distinguish be-
tween reservations with respect to bilateral and multilateral treaties,233
the context in which such reservations are made is quite different and
there appears to be a general consensus that different rules are applica-
ble.234 The law of contract is invoked by analogy and a reservation to a
bilateral treaty is considered a counter-offer requiring the assent of the
other party to the treaty. Failure to assent constitutes a rejection of the
counter-offer and no treaty comes into force, although (continuing the
analogy to the law of contract) acceptance of the counter-offer may arise
by implication from acquiescence. 235
Although the issue appears largely unaddressed, express under-
standings with respect to bilateral treaties may not be strictly subject to
the rules of offer and acceptance because understandings purport not to
affect the obligations of the parties. For example, one party might ex-
232. Although the Senate resolution of ratification does not contain a condition requiring the
enactment of implementing legislation prior to ratification, the State Department stated in a letter to
a member of Senate Foreign Relations Committee that it would not deposit the instrument until
legislation had been enacted (see Letter from J. Mullina, Asst. Sec'y, Legis. Affairs, to Senator
Pressler dated April 4, 1990, reprinted in S. ExEC. Doc. No. 30, supra note 222, at 39-40). Were the
U.S. to fail to adopt necessary implementing legislation in a timely manner following ratification,
then refusal to allow individuals to assert its protections might defeat the object and purpose of the
treaty. Note, however, that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Report on the Convention, in
discussing the declaration denying self-execution, states that the majority of U.S. obligations are
already covered by existing law and that "additional implementing legislation will be needed only
with respect to article 5, dealing with areas of criminal jurisdiction" S. ExEc. Doc. No. 30, supra
note 222, at 10.
233. The International Law Commission in its Eighteenth Session Report with respect to the
Convention expressed the view that "[a] reservation to a bilateral treaty presents no problem, be-
cause it amounts to a new proposal reopening the negotiations between the two States concerning the
terms of the treaty." Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Eighteenth
Session, [1966] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 172, at 202-03, U.N. Doc. A/6309/Rev. 1.
234. See Bishop, supra note 60, at 266-71; HIRSCH LAUTERPACHT, I OPPENHEIM'S INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 914 (8th ed. 1955); RESTATEMENT, supra note 4, § 313, cmt. f.
235. LAUTERPACHT, supra note 234, at 914.
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pressly offer its interpretation of the treaty and the other party expressly
respond by stating that it does not agree with that interpretation, but
both may nevertheless agree to permit the treaty to enter into force and
be judged according to its terms and context. This would not appear to
undermine the integrity of the treaty because the parties have at least
implicitly agreed that the proffered understanding does not purport to
modify the terms of the treaty. In most cases, however, the parties will
expressly accept or reject an understanding with binding effect.
2. Municipal U.S. Law with Respect to Reservations and
Understandings to Bilateral Treaties
A reservation purports to modify the obligations of the parties to a
treaty and therefore, in the bilateral context, creates, at least with respect
to the affected provisions, a different treaty. Since the Senate is required
by Article II of the Constitution to consent to the making of a treaty, the
Senate generally should give its consent before the President may accept
a reservation proposed by another treaty party.236 However, if the Senate
has previously consented to ratification, and a reservation by the other
party to the treaty is thereafter brought to the attention of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, and there is no request by that Committee
to reconsider the treaty, the consent of the Senate to the reservation
might be implied from its prior consent. That, at least, is the suggestion
arising from the practice followed with respect to the Panama Canal
Treaties.237
3. The Panama Canal Treaties
U.S. ratification of the Panama Canal Treaties raised the issue of
whether the Senate must give its express consent to reservations and un-
derstandings accompanying the instrument of ratification of the second
party to a bilateral treaty. The Senate resolution of ratification with re-
spect to the Neutrality Treaty included amendments, conditions, reserva-
tions, and understandings, and expressly included an understanding that
236. RESTATEMENT, supra note 4, § 313, cmt. f.
237. GLENNON, supra note 1, at 124-25, refers to a "little-noticed" incident in 1976 involving the
Spanish Bases Treaty. In its advice and consent to that treaty, the Senate had included a five part
declaration expressing support for democratic reforms. The Spanish parliament objected to inclusion
of the declaration in the instrument of ratification, and after consultation with the Foreign Relations
Committee, the State Department included the declaration in an annex to the treaty incorporated by
reference in the instrument of ratification. The State Department advised the Committee that this
procedure was the equivalent of incorporation in the instrument of ratification. Although the State
Department position appears unassailable, Glennon indicates that this episode encouraged greater
specificity on the part of the Senate with respect to the intended placement of its conditions and
influenced the Senate's actions with respect to the Panama Canal Treaties.
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they should be incorporated in the U.S. instrument of ratification. 238 One
item designated as a "condition" to the Neutrality Treaty purported to
give the United States the right to use military force in Panama to main-
tain the operation of the canal and another "condition" in effect provided
that the Treaty would not be construed to preclude an additional agree-
ment(s) for the stationing of U.S. military forces in Panama after Decem-
ber 31, 1999. Panama thereafter added certain understandings and a
declaration to its instrument of ratification to the Neutrality Treaty
which included reference to the necessity for observing the principles of
the U.N. Charter and principles of mutual respect (including the declara-
tion that it would oppose intervention in its internal affairs). Although
Panama's proposed instrument of ratification was made available to the
Senate leadership and the Foreign Relations Committee prior to the ex-
change of instruments of ratification, Panama's understandings and dec-
laration were not expressly assented to by the Senate in a resolution of
ratification.
Since the Senate statements to which Panama responded were la-
beled "conditions," it is not immediately apparent what effect the Senate
intended these provisions to have with respect to United States legal obli-
gations under the Neutrality Treaty. However, to the extent that the Sen-
ate reserved the right to intervene militarily in Panama, and this right
was not otherwise expressly set forth in the Treaty, this condition affects
Panamanian interests of fundamental importance, arguably modifies the
terms of the treaty by enlarging U.S. rights, and perhaps constitutes a
reservation. Similarly, the intended legal effect of Panama's response is
not clear, but because it purports to preserve its right to oppose the use of
force by the United States under certain conditions, it affects a matter of
fundamental importance to the United States, arguably modifies the
terms of the treaty by enlarging Panamanian rights, and might be con-
strued as a reservation. 239
As a matter of international law, the fact that the United States and
Panama exchanged instruments of ratification which included their re-
238. See Neutrality Treaty, Sept. 7, 1977, U.S.-Pan., 33 UST 11 [hereinafter Neutrality Treaty];
Proclamation by the President of the United States, reprinted in Neutrality Treaty, id. at 3, setting
forth the text of the President's Proclamation with the text of the Senate Resolution subject to the
statements designated as amendments, conditions, reservations and understandings. For Senate reso-
lution of ratification, see 124 CONG. REc. S7187, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.(1978). See generally Riesen.
feld, International Agreements, supra note 3, at 459-62.
239. This is not to suggest that the U.S. and Panamanian statements may not appropriately be
characterized as interpretations consistent with the treaty. The U.S. may argue that the right to use
force in Panama is inherent in the right to defend the neutrality of the canal. Panama may argue that
it merely asserted its right to defend against other uses of force-such as force used to effect a change
in its internal political structure.
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spective conditions should conclusively establish the validity of each
party's consent. The U.S. may not defeat its own consent by arguing an
internal procedural defect because it is most unlikely that the potential
defect could be deemed "manifest" in this case.240 Moreover, because the
Senate had notice of the Panamanian statements before and after the ex-
change of instruments of ratification, it would appear to have implicitly
acquiesced to them. Because the validity of the assent of the parties to a
treaty is a question of international law, the conclusion that the Neutral-
ity Treaty is valid as a matter of international law establishes that the
Treaty is valid as a matter of U.S. law. 24 1
G. The Treaty-Making Power of the U.S. Congress
The "advice and consent" process provided for in Article II of the
U.S. Constitution is not the exclusive procedure for the making of trea-
ties, nor is it the most frequently used procedure. The President acting
under his or her own constitutional authority may enter into sole Execu-
tive Agreements without reference to Congress. The President's in-
dependent authority derives from the general executive authority under
Article II, section 1;242 the Commander in Chief power under Article II,
section 2, clause 1; the authority to receive Ambassadors under Article
II, section 3, and; the obligation to "take care that the laws be faithfully
executed" under Article II, section 3.243 Although most Executive
Agreements "have involved military or foreign relations matters having
no direct impact on private interests in the United States," 244 a number
of such agreements have involved the settlement of private claims against
240. Article 46 of the Vienna Convention provides that in order for a state to invoke failure to
comply with a provision of its internal law to defeat its consent to a treaty, the violation must be
"manifest" and concern a rule of "fundamental importance." The U.S. Department of State has
contended that since the Panamanian statements were not true reservations they need not have been
brought to the Senate for consent. See Riesenfeld, International Agreements, supra note 3, at 461.
241. An interesting example of a Senate reservation to a bilateral treaty involved the 1923 Treaty
of Friendship, Commerce and Consular Rights with Germany, which included a provision which
granted national treatment to professional service providers of each party. In 1953, an Agreement
was concluded concerning application of the 1923 Treaty which would have rendered fully operative
the provision on professional activity. When the Senate gave its consent to ratification of the 1953
Agreement, it did so subject to a reservation severely limiting the right of German nationals to
engage in professional activities in the United States. Germany consented to the reservation. Similar
reservations were made by the Senate in the same period in consenting to the ratification of FCN
treaties with Denmark, Greece, Israel and Japan. See M. WHrrEmAN, 14 DIGEST OF INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 159-61 (1970).
242. The Supreme Court has recognized that the power to represent the nation in the conduct of
foreign affairs is inherent in the President's executive authority (see United States v. Curtis Wright
Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936)).
243. See, eg., RESTATEMENT, supra note 4, § 303, cmt. g and reporter's note 11; Circular 175,
supra note 40, § 721.2(b)(3).
244. RESTATEMENT, supra note 4, § 303, reporter's note 11.
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foreign governments and have resulted in Supreme Court decisions af-
firming presidential authority. 245 The Supreme Court recently observed,
in Weinberger v. Rossi,246 that sole Executive Agreements "may in appro-
priate circumstances have an effect similar to treaties in some areas of
domestic law."' 247 Of course, many Executive Agreements are entered
into under specific or general statutory authority (see discussion of Con-
gressional-Executive Agreements infra). Those entered into by the Presi-
dent under independent constitutional authority therefore are sometimes
referred to as "sole" Executive Agreements. The President may also
enter into Executive Agreements under authority established by another
treaty.248
Because sole Executive Agreements are not subject to preratification
approval by the Senate or Congress, no issues are raised with respect to
the attachment of conditions to their approval. Pursuant to the Case Act,
such agreements must be transmitted by the President to Congress fol-
lowing entry into force.249
The most significant evolution of constitutional practice involving
the treaty-making process in the United States relates to Congressional
approval of treaties. McDougal and Lans demonstrated convincingly in
the 1940s that within the U.S. constitutional structure the power to con-
clude treaties with the "advice and consent" of the Senate provided for in
Article II is permissive rather than exclusive, and that the President and
Congress (most particularly pursuant to the Article I, section 8, legisla-
tive powers of the Congress) together possess an entirely coextensive
treaty-making power. 250 This is now the prevailing view. 251 The Congres-
sional-Executive agreement process involves the passage by Congress of a
joint resolution or legislation authorizing or approving the President's
conclusion of an international agreement, 252 in some cases accompanied
245. See, e.g., Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981); United States v. Pink, 315 U.S.
203 (1942); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937).
246. 456 U.S. 25 (1982).
247. Id. at 30 n.6. While this statement suggests that such agreements may be self-executing and
override federal statutes antedating them, the issue is not one which has been squarely faced by the
Supreme Court.
248. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 4, § 303(3).
249. Supra note 45.
250. McDougal & Lans, supra note 1. McDougal and Lans did not specifically address the issue
with which we are principally concerned in this article, i.e., the effect of Senate conditions in interna-
tional and domestic law, although the process by which ratification of the Treaty of Versailles was
blocked in the U.S. Senate, which involved the attachment of amendments and reservations unac-
ceptable to President Wilson through the efforts of an obstructionist minority, was at the forefront of
their concerns. Id. at 651-56.
251. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 4, § 303, reporter's note 8.
252. RESTATEMENT, supra note 4, § 303(2). See also id § 303 at reporter's note 8.
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by the enactment of domestic implementing legislation. Although the fol-
lowing figures do not reflect whether the referenced Executive Agree-
ments were made under the President's sole authority, or explicit or
implicit statutory authority, between 1932 and 1982 the United States
entered into 608 treaties pursuant to the advice and consent of the Senate
and 9,548 Executive Agreements. 25 3 As of January 1, 1983, the United
States was a party to 966 treaties and 6,571 Executive (including Con-
gressional-Executive) Agreements in force.25 ' It should be noted that
human rights255 and arms control256 treaties have not yet been the sub-
ject of the congressional approval process.
Because Congress has the express constitutional authority to regu-
late commerce with foreign nations,25 7 the Congressional-Executive
Agreement as an instrument to undertake commitments with respect to
international trade has particular constitutional appeal. 258 Most recently,
international trade agreements have become the subject of the so-called
"fast track" procedure which is a form of bicameral congressional ap-
proval.259 In the fast track procedure, the Congress agrees to impose lim-
itations on itself in exchange for commitments by the President. In
notifying the Congress of an intention to negotiate an international trade
agreement under the fast track procedure, the President commits the Ex-
ecutive branch to consultation with Congress concerning the agreement
and implementing legislation. In exchange, the Congress commits to cer-
tain internal rules changes that are designed to guarantee an expeditious
consideration of a completed agreement and any proposed implementing
legislation when presented to it, and it agrees to vote the agreement and
legislation up or down without amendment. 260 Recent experience sug-
gests that the fast track procedure may enhance congressional input into
253. See Cong. Res. Study, supra note 1, at 37. According to the Study:
[o]ne study found that 88.3 percent of international agreements reached between 1946 and
1972 were based at least partly on statutory authority; 6.2 percent were treaties [i.e. re-
ceived Senate consent], and 5.5 percent were based solely on executive authority."
Id at 39-40.
254. Id. at 39.
255. Although, with respect to human rights, Congress authorized the President to accept mem-
bership in the International Labor Organization. Ch. 676, 48 Stat. 1182 (1934), See RESATEMENT,
supra note 4, § 303, reporter's note 8.
256. Although, according to the Congressional Research Study, the Senate "has endorsed their
possible use for arms control agreements." Cong. Res. Study, supra note 1, at 18.
257. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
258. Nothing in the Constitution precludes use of the Senate advice and consent process (as was
long traditional in the conclusion of treaties of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation).
259. See, e.g., Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, §§ 101-02,151, (88 Stat.) 1978 (1975);
Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-573, § 401(a)(2), (98 Stat.) 2948, 3014-15 (1984).
260. Congress expressly reserves the right to change the internal rules defining the fast track
procedure at any time. Trade Act of 1974, supra note 259, § 151(a)(2) at 2001.
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the treaty-making process. 261
From the standpoint of the President, the congressional treaty ap-
proval process has an obvious appeal. The President should generally
find it easier to obtain the approval of a majority of both houses of Con-
gress than the approval of two-thirds of the Senate. 262 While the Senate,
on the other hand, may be quite reluctant to permit encroachment on its
foreign affairs prerogative, some of the concerns of the Founding Fa-
thers, who deprived the House of Representatives of an Article II treaty-
making role, are certainly less viable than they were in 1789. Concerns
regarding the speed at which the House might act are much less compel-
ling in light of transportation and telecommunications advances. The
need for secrecy in certain sensitive matters may remain a valid concern
- on the theory that the greater number of persons privy to a secret, the
greater its likelihood of public disclosure - and this may provide an
arguable basis for continuing Senate primacy in certain arms control
matters. On the other hand, in areas in which individual rights are at
stake it appears more consistent with the theory of democratic govern-
ment and majoritarian rule underlying the Constitution to place the
treaty approval power in the hands of the Congress as a whole, rather
than in the hands of one-third-plus one of the Senate, where it is effec-
tively placed when this minority of the Senate is granted the power to
disapprove of treaty ratification. 263 This is particularly so as treaties in-
creasingly impact on individual rights across a broad spectrum of
interests.
Congressional conditions to the approval of treaties appear to be
rare. One notable instance of conditional approval involved the United
Nations Headquarters Agreement. In a joint resolution authorizing the
President to bring the Agreement into effect, 2M Congress included a pro-
vision potentially providing the United States with a basis for limiting the
access of aliens.2 65 The terms of the joint resolution were brought to the
attention of the General Assembly by the Secretary-General, but there
261. For example, with regard to the proposed North American Free Trade Area Agreement,
Congress has played an active role regarding arrangements with respect to the environment. See
Frederick M. Abbott, International Trade Rules, World Market Conditions and Environmental Ef-
fects, in 2 YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 227-29 (Giinther Handl ed.,
1991).
262. Since World War II, the President and the majority of Congress have typically been of
different political parties, making it particularly difficult for the President to assure a two-thirds vote
of approval in the Senate.
263. Of course this observation is not novel. See McDougal & Lans, supra note 1, at 665-75.
264. Pub. L. 80-357, 61 Stat. 756 (1947).
265. Id., Annex 2, § 6 at 767-68.
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was no action by the General Assembly accepting or taking note of it.266
In the exchange of notes bringing the agreement into effect, the United
States declared that its consent was subject to the terms of the joint reso-
lution.267 The joint resolution has been a source of controversy between
the United States and United Nations ever since.268
The fact that the resolution with respect to the Headquarters Agree-
ment was adopted by Congress as a whole rather than the Senate is of no
consequence as a matter of international law. If the condition is a valid
part of the treaty it should condition the obligations of the parties.269
However, the municipal legal effect of this condition - and similar con-
ditions adopted by joint congressional resolution or legislation - may
well be altered by its legislative character. Unlike a Senate reservation or
understanding, a joint resolution of Congress with respect to a treaty has
all of the relevant characteristics of domestic legislation. Because such a
joint resolution is the equivalent of legislation it should be given legal
effect by United States courts irrespective of its status under international
law.
As noted previously, one characteristic of the so-called "fast track"
procedure now used for the approval and implementation of trade-re-
lated treaties is that Congress agrees in advance to vote on approval of
the treaty and implementing legislation without consideration of amend-
ments.270 Starting with the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, which ap-
proved the GATT Tokyo Round accords, and continuing with the acts
approving and implementing the U.S.-Israel and U.S.-Canada Free
Trade Area Agreements, there are included provisions which deny the
creation of private rights of action under the agreements (except as ex-
plicitly provided for). These provisions therefore purport to deny self-
executing character to the respective trade agreements. For example, the
Trade Agreements Act of 1979 which approved the Tokyo Round Codes
provides:
UNSPECIFIED PRIVATE REMEDIES NOT CREATED.-Neither
the entry into force with respect to the United States of any agreement
approved .... nor the enactment of this Act, shall be construed as
creating any private right of action or remedy for which provision is
266. RESTATEMENT, SUpra note 4, § 468, reporter's note 7.
267. Id.
268. Id. On interplay of Headquarters Agreement and Joint Resolution, see W. Michael Reis-
man, Editorial Commentr" The Arafat Visa Affair: Exceeding the Bounds of Host State Discretion, 83
AM. J. INT'L L. 519 (1989).
269. Whether the joint resolution is a valid part of the treaty and, if not, whether the treaty itself
is validly in force are complex questions as to which we do not express an opinion.
270. See Trade Act of 1974, supra note 259, § 151(d) at 2002.
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not explicitly made under this Act or the laws of the United States.27 1
The self-executing character of the GATT and the Tokyo Round
Codes is the subject of much discussion. Although the European Court
of Justice has held that the GATT is not self-executing because of the
general nature of its drafting and the reciprocal nation to nation nature
of its obligations, 272 it recently construed and applied the terms of the
GATT in a case involving private enforcement of trade rights under the
so-called New Instrument. 273 In the European Community, at least, the
self-executing character of the GATT is now debatable. In the United
States the matter has not been squarely addressed by the courts. 27 4 The
Tokyo Round Codes are drafted in more specific terms than the GATT
itself and an argument for considering them to be self-executing is per-
haps stronger than with respect to the GATT itself. There are no court
decisions with respect to the self-executing nature of the United States-
Israel and United States-Canada Free Trade Area Agreements. How-
ever, the two Free Trade Area Agreements are bilateral and specifically
drafted and it is therefore not unlikely that a court, in the absence of
controlling legislation, might find one or both of these agreements to be
self-executing, at least in part.
271. Treaty Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, § 3(f), 93 (Stat. 144). Professor Hudec
has noted that the language of the 1979 Act suggests by negative inference that private rights may be
created by the agreements under pre-existing legislation, but concludes "it is doubtful, however, that
these drafting difficulties will ever persuade a court to characterize the Tokyo Round Codes as self-
executing," ROBERT E. HUDEC, THE LEGAL STATUS OF GATT IN THE DOMESTIC LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND GATT 187, 230 (Meinhard Hilf et al. eds.,
1986).
The Act approving and implementing the Israel-United States Free Trade Area Agreement
provides (under a section entitled "Relationship of the Agreement to United States Law"):
PRIVATE REMEDIES NOT CREATED.- Neither the entry into force of the
Agreement with respect to the United States, nor the enactment of this Act, shall be con-
strued as creating any private right of action or remedy for which provision is not explicitly
made under this Act or under the laws of the United States.
19 U.S.C. § 2112, sec. 5(d)(1988).
The Act approving and implementing the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement
provides:
EFFECT OF AGREEMENT WITH RESPECT TO PRIVATE REMEDIES.- No
person other than the United States shall-
(1) have any cause of action or defense under the Agreement or by virtue of congressional
approval thereof, or
(2) challenge, in any action brought under any provision of law, any action or inaction by
any department, agency, or other instrumentality of the United States, any State, or any
political subdivision of a State on the ground that such action or inaction is inconsistent
with the agreement.
19 U.S.C. § 2112, sec. 102(c)(1988).
272. See International Fruit Co. v. Produktschap voor Groeten en Fruit, 1972 E.C.R. 1219,
1236.
273. See Case 70/87, Fd66ration de Pindustrie de Phailerie de la CEE (Fediol) v. Commission,
1989 E.C.R. 1781.
274. See generally HUDEC, supra note 271, at 200-02.
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The constitutional status of a congressional act defining the self-exe-
cuting nature of treaty rights is distinguishable from a unicameral decla-
ration by the Senate to the same effect contained in a resolution of
ratification. A treaty to which legislation pertains is not itself modified by
congressional action so its self-executing nature as a matter of interna-
tional law is not affected. Congress does not have the power to alter the
international meaning of a treaty by legislation. However, under
Supreme Court doctrine the legislature does have the right to enact and
make effective subsequent inconsistent legislation, whether or not such
legislation may put the United States in default of its international legal
obligations.
The critical distinction between a Senate declaration as to the self-
executing character of a treaty and a congressional act to the same effect
lies in its constitutional character. The Senate may not legislate outside
the confines of the treaty instrument. A declaration inconsistent with the
treaty is ineffective as a matter of international and municipal law. Con-
gress, on the other hand, may legislate with domestic effect without re-
spect to international legal consequences. Therefore, an act of Congress
defining the self-executing character of a treaty should be given munici-
pal legal effect regardless of its effect on the international plane.275
III. TREATY-MAKING, CONDITIONAL CONSENT AND THE
DEMOCRATIC STATE
Although treaties played a very important role in international rela-
tions in 1789, there can be little doubt that they play a far more impor-
tant role at the close of the twentieth century. We live in a world in
which global interdependence is so manifest as not to require elaboration.
The shaping of ideas and opinions through instantaneous global telecom-
munications, the dependence of states on international trade for the pro-
duction and distribution of goods and services, the understanding that
individual state decisions to control or not control environmental emis-
sions impact neighboring and distant states, and the continuing global
proliferation of instruments of violence and the ramifications of this
trend for peace and security all indicate the importance of the role of
international treaties in governing this sphere of interdependence.
The global transition from the relative independence of sovereign
states to the fundamental dependence of states must also have its ramifi-
cations for domestic legal processes. At the close of the twentieth cen-
275. This analysis rests on the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Constitution to the effect
that treaties and federal statutes are pan' passu.
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tury, international decisions more immediately and directly impact
individuals than international decisions of the eighteenth century. In
eighteenth century Europe the decisions by monarchs to make or break
alliances, to wage war or make peace and to open or close their borders
to trade were certainly of great moment to the common citizen. The im-
pact of such decisions, however, was often slow to be felt. The regula-
tions of the European Communities Council and Commission, on the
other hand, may have an immediate and direct effect on individuals. Sim-
ilarly, an amendment to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
may open a local market to intense foreign competition in a matter of
months rather than years and give rise to a major restructuring of the
local business environment. A decision of the European Court of Human
Rights may quickly find itself the subject of the attention of American
legal scholars while a decision of the U.S. Supreme Court will as likely
find itself the subject of discussion by European scholars.
The question naturally arises whether the treaty power may require
internal adaptations to reflect the increasingly significant impact of trea-
ties on municipal legal systems and the increasingly direct and immediate
impact on individual rights and obligations. Framed differently, the ques-
tion naturally arises whether the center of gravity of the treaty power
rests now more in the legislative rather than the executive arena. Does
the treaty-making power require increasing "democratization?"
In respect to the United States, McDougal and Lans convincingly
demonstrated in the 1940s that the majoritarian principles underlying the
American Constitution strongly favored congressional participation in
the treaty-making process. McDougal and Lans saw that individual citi-
zens in the post-World War II setting demanded international policies
which continued the wartime alliances that ultimately prevailed over the
dark forces seeking global domination of the human spirit. This demand
manifested itself in overwhelming public support for the creation of the
United Nations structure which effectively precluded xenophobic resist-
ance in the Senate to adherence to the U.N. Charter such as had mani-
fested itself with respect to the Treaty of Versailles. The international
framework has now evolved further and politicians, scholars, interest
groups, and others are demanding greater international recognition of
the rights of individuals. In the face of this demand, it is apparent that a
minority of the U.S. Senate has been forced to shift from a role in which
it seeks to block the approval of major treaties guaranteeing individual
rights to a less visible role in which it seeks to undermine the creation
and enforcement of such rights through the process of attaching condi-
tions to the approval of treaties. Perhaps the best solution to this problem
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lies in the process by which the President seeks direct congressional ap-
proval of treaties. In this process, conditions to treaty obligations will be
adopted only by the majority will of both Houses of Congress. If, how-
ever, a majority of the Senate insists on maintaining a foreign affairs pre-
rogative and forces treaty approval into the Senate, it is essential that the
courts of the United States consider carefully the constitutional basis for
conditions imposed on such approval. We suggest that the power of the
Senate to give effect to conditions to treaties is constrained by interna-
tional law and the Constitution. Only a condition which is valid and ef-
fective under international law may become part of the law of the land
because a condition does not have a legal identity outside the context of
the treaty. The Senate does not have an ancillary constitutional power to
enact domestic legislation under the guise of the treaty power.

